Monday, December 26, 2011

Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. Chapter 4: So Where Did They Go? “Resettlement” to the East (2). “Resettlement” for MGK.

"Resettlement" for MGK

In attacking the work of Holocaust historians regarding the death camps, MGK deride them for “creating a historiographical picture out of selected pieces of eyewitness testimony and a handful of arbitrarily interpreted documents.”[34] Unfortunately, the trio’s resettlement thesis is guilty of exactly that, as will be shown throughout the remainder of this chapter. Contrary to their finger pointing at historians’ selective use of witness testimony, for example, MGK are brazen enough to spin witness accounts of the death camps and gas chambers as evidence of transit camps.[35] Indeed, despite their recognition of “the necessity of comparing the witness accounts with available material evidence,” MGK fail to properly use either type of evidence in their own propositions.[36] They also exhibit not only ignorance of the realities behind the Eastern front, where they think some two million Jews could easily be resettled into, but they also ignore several documents which clearly dispel such notions.
One of the many glaring deficiencies of their resettlement hypothesis is MGK’s reliance upon a handful of wartime news sources referencing deportations to the East, which the trio takes to be part of a resettlement program. The actual destinations of the deportees are very rarely specified in the reports, an indication of how weak the information was to MGK’s sources (due to the limited amount of available information), and how feebly such articles serve as evidence.[37] Also, as has been noted earlier, such sources tend to be some of the least reliable forms of evidence that one could use in retrospect for an event, due to the limited and speculated information available at the time of their writing. An analogy would be to study and cite American news reports during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq in the period of 2002 and early 2003; of course one might well conclude from the reports that weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq at the time of the invasion. Such a conclusion would be based solely on an artificially limited (and hence, distorted) survey of available sources.
Similarly to the 2003 Iraqi war comparison, many news reports during the Second World War changed their conclusions as more information was made available to them. The American Jewish Yearbook, one source which MGK quote-mine and distort in their works, focused more and more on the Nazi extermination policy against the Jews as time went on.[38] The Judisk Krönika similarly described Nazi killings of Jews later in the war through shooting as well as gassing, as Kues admits (but, of course, disagrees with).[39] Kues has even used two Soviet and communist reports describing the shooting of European Jews in the Baltic as evidence for resettlement, so desperate he is from a lack of sources.[40]
One of the most popular wartime sources for ‘resettlement’ among deniers at the present time is the 1943 work of Canadian demographer Eugene Kulischer, who wrote a study on population movements at the time in Europe with information that was made available to him by various institutions.[41] In Kulischer’s report he accepted that hundreds of thousands of Jews had been transported to the occupied Eastern territories by the Third Reich, not certain that any other fate was possible.[42] The credibility of these institutions’ limited information from wartime Europe, as common sense would dictate, was questionable due to its clandestine nature. Rumours and hearsay statements were placed on an equal level with direct testimonies and sources, thus muddling fact and fiction. Kulischer also lacked any official and independent demographic sources to corroborate the wartime reports regarding wartime population movements, and thus was only presented an extremely narrow picture of the contemporary events in Europe. Despite Mattogno’s claim that the work was written “with scientific exactitude and is undergirded by a copious documentation,”[43] Kulischer wrote in the introduction to his work that the limits of the evidence for his work meant that his study “must necessarily be regarded in many ways as of a preliminary and provisional nature.”[44]
MGK’s heavy reliance on Kulischer (who recognized the limitations of his own study, and even suspected Nazi exterminations) shows how desperate the trio is for evidence of resettlement. Indeed, Kulischer himself discarded his former ideas once better information came out of Europe, calculating in a 1948 publication that 5.5 million Jews had been exterminated by the Nazis.[45] This does not stop MGK from spamming thousands of words from Kulischer’s 1943 report in their books and articles (a common feature of Mattogno and Kues’ work).[46] It is likely that MGK picked up on the Kulischer gambit from Enrique Aynat in his 1994 Considérations sur la déportation des juifs de France et de Belgique à l'est de l'Europe en 1942, which was the first denier work to reference Kulischer in support of the resettlement thesis.[47] Aynat’s reference was then used by Jean-Marie Boisdefeu in a 1996 VHO lecture as well.[48] The recent usage of Kulischer stands in stark contrast to the comments of early denier David Hoggan, who called Kulischer’s demographic work “pure guess-work,” and declared it to be “a highly untrustworthy source for serious scholars.”[49] As Hoggan’s comments related to Kulischer’s post-war work, when more sources of better evidentiary value were available, one can treble such comments regarding his 1943 work.
MGK also have attempted to provide documentary evidence for their counterfactual scenario. It should be noted at the onset that MGK themselves admit that the handful of documents they utilize still do not prove resettlement.[50] Indeed, as shown earlier, they misinterpret several documents related to the deportations of Jews.[51] One of their misconstrued points relates to the deportation of French Jews in 1942, which although indirectly relevant to the Aktion Reinhard camps, are still appropriate to the wider resettlement issue. As Mattogno is fond of pointing out[52], French Jews were initially deported to Auschwitz primarily for labor purposes during that year, as shown by the large numbers of French Jews selected to stay in the camp.[53] While Mattogno believes that children were originally deported into the General Government instead of only Auschwitz, the documents that he cites do not bear this out; while there originally may have been such a plan[54], once children began to deported from France, their only destination was Auschwitz.[55] By mid August, a transport departed Drancy to Auschwitz containing “children for the first time.”[56] Theodor Dannecker’s goal of a final solution with a “total extermination of the (Jewish) adversary” was thus coming true.[57]
Furthermore on the French Jews, Mattogno cites a September 1, 1942 note from SS-Untersturmführer Ahnert in the RSHA department IV B 4, recorded in the wake of a 28 August 1942 conference at the RSHA.[58] The document records Eichmann’s wish to include material in the transports so as to build barracks for the deportees, as a “camp is supposed to be set up in Russia.”[59] On the face of it, the document looks to be a smoking gun of transports into the occupied Soviet territories. Unfortunately for Mattogno, there is more to the source than meets the eye. First of all, if a camp was still to be set up in Russia in September 1942, then one could effectively rule out any previous resettlement camps for the supposed hundreds of thousands of deportees already resettled by that period. However, a pre-meeting instruction to Ahnert from Paris Gestapo chief Heinz Roethke speaks of the construction of barracks at a camp in Düsseldorf (in the Rhineland).[60] Even before Roethke’s August 26, 1942, message to Ahnert an August 17, 1942 document from RSHA financial officer Standartenführer Dr. Siegert speaks of French Jews being evacuated into a “special collection camp” in the western part of the Reich, due to safety concerns.[61] The materials for the construction of this camp were to be sent from France, in order to save on costs. Given the documents from Roethke and Siegert, Ahnert’s mention of a camp in Russia is certainly a mistake for the Rhineland, where Düsseldorf is located (Rheinland for Russland in German). Thus, there was no camp in Russia, as the French Jews were not even going to make it that far east. 
Another hurdle for MGK’s resettlement thesis is the ambiguity that exists over who were to be deported. In sections that Mattogno writes, he makes several points specifying those to be deported beyond the AR camps and Auschwitz as being unfit for labor.[62] Kues and Graf, however, often refer to deportations from the death sites to labor camps or related work projects in the occupied Soviet territories. Such examples include a reclamation scheme with the Pripyat Marshes[63], the Vievis labor camp[64], harvest work in the Ukraine[65], the Vaivara labor complex in Estonia[66], the Lenta labor camp in Latvia[67], and other general military work projects[68], including those in close proximity to the frontline.[69] We suggest that before offering their baseless speculation of resettlement, MGK actually confer with one another to decide who was actually to be resettled in such a program.
While MGK often cite the deportations of German Jews in 1941-1942 to selected areas in the occupied Eastern territories as evidence against extermination[70], they do not seem to realize the significance of these deportations in relation to their idea of resettlement. Despite their own admission, MGK never grapple with the fact that the deportation of 66,200 Jews from the Altreich, Ostmark, and the Protectorate proceeded to their destinations without stopping in Auschwitz or the AR camps.[71] Why 3% of the “number of Jews deported to the occupied Eastern territories” would not travel through one of the Revisionist deemed transit camps (Auschwitz, Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor, or Chelmno) remains unexplained in their work. Several transports using the Bialystok to Minsk line travelled just 4 km away from Treblinka, but never stopped in the camp for any type of delousing, which MGK assume occurred there for hundreds of thousands of others. Instead, MGK believe that these trains were deported directly to their destinations in the East (i.e. Riga and Minsk), “w/o (sic) any stop-over in a camp.”[72] Unfortunately, this is not correct, as some of the Jews deported to Minsk actually changed trains at Wolkowysk station in what is today western Belarus.[73]
MGK never significantly discuss the hundreds of transports that travelled westwards to the death camps, whilst they argue that these deportees were all sent eastwards. This led several groups of Jews (i.e. from Galicia, Romania, Bialystok, Ostland, etc) to head in the completely wrong direction from the eastern territories in 1942 and 1943, something illogical from the perspective of a resettlement program. Indeed, a reasonable estimate would be that at least 500,000 Jews were transported westward to the extermination camps during these years.[74] These westward transports to the camps have been discussed in Holocaust literature for decades, including in works that have been cited (and we hope read) by MGK.[75] Mattogno has only briefly discussed a fraction of these westward transports (those from Bialystok in August 1943), where he says they were simply deported into the Lublin area via Treblinka.[76] Despite the incorrect statement[77], one should not expect Lublin to be the ultimate resettlement destination for hundreds of thousands of Jews. It should also be remembered that at a time when there was a transport moratorium of eastbound trains into the occupied Soviet territories from December 1942 to January 1943, thousands of Jews were being brought westwards to Treblinka. These are the 10,335 Jews brought to Treblinka during the last weeks of 1942, as recorded in the Höfle telegram. These Jews could not have been redirected back east due to the transportation difficulty.[78] The only supportable and reasonable explanation of their fate is death inside the camp.
In detailing the supposed resettlement program, MGK intentionally leave a gaping hole in their argument by refusing to discuss the fate of Jews deported to the death camps in 1944 (when Nazi territories were swiftly shrinking due to the advancing Soviet armies), most specifically the 320,000 Hungarian Jews who were deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau but never registered and never classified as "transit Jews" (Durchgangsjuden).[79] Anti-Zionist and Revisionist sympathizer Peter Myers has declared these deportations to be the “fatal flaw in Holocaust denial,” signifying its “End-Game.”[80] As MGK write in Sobibor, “no Hungarian Jews ever reached the eastern areas, which were rapidly shrinking in size at the time.”[81] In addition to the Hungarian Jews must be added tens of thousands of Polish Jews deported both to Chelmno and Auschwitz throughout 1944. With regard to Chelmno, MGK totally ignore a crucial document from Greiser to Pohl in February 1944 which stated that “The reduction of the [Lodz ghetto] population will be carried out by the Sonderkommando of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Bothmann, which operated in the area previously.”[82] Where would these Jews have been sent at such a late stage in the war?
Two earlier studies by Graf and Mattogno (nearly a decade old) on the Hungarian Jews failed to arrive at any realistic conclusions (after denying homicidal gassings).[83] Instead of investigating the fate of these Jews further throughout the decade, they simply declared that as they were not sent to the east “we do not have to consider Hungary” with respect to their argument.[84] Such a neglectful ignorance by the proponents of ‘historical-technical’ analysis appears intellectually dishonest, plain and simple. It also contradicts a point made by Revisionist ‘headmaster’ Germar Rudolf, who demanded that people understand a subject so as not to use their ignorance as a “justification” for failure to act upon such knowledge.[85] Indeed, even Revisionist Arthur Butz recognizes the tremendous problem posed by the fate of Hungarian Jews if they were transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau: “It is however a problem for Graf, and he does not solve it. For him it is not just an unresolved detail, but a consideration challenging the credibility of his entire thesis.”[86]
MGK also fail to use any statements from German railway workers in support of resettlement. Walter Mannl, a chief operating officer in Kattowitz (responsible for Auschwitz’s rail station), was told in early 1942 by the Auschwitz stationmaster that a concrete gas chamber was being used to kill Jews in the camp.[87] Eduard Kryschak, a conductor who often led trains to the Treblinka camp, recalled a Jewish maid in Bialystok with a great fear of Treblinka, and who prophesized that one day she would be gone and no longer able to clean rooms; Kryschak noted that the maid’s fear came true. In the Reichsbahn canteen at Malkinia, Hans Prause, a staffworker at the Ostbahn divisional headquarters in Warsaw, joined a discussion between the Malkinia stationmaster and an SS officer ‘Michaelsen’.[88] Michaelsen told Prause and the stationmaster of the “humane” Treblinka killings and offered both workers the chance to tour the camp, an invitation that Prause declined. Bialystok based conductor Richard Neuser heard from co-workers about the fate of the Jews after their deportation, and quickly requested from his operations master that he avoid such duty. Rolf Rückel, who worked in the highest Reichsbahn operations office (responsible for overall operations and the freight train schedules), stated after the war that knowledge of the killing operations among the leading Reichsbahn officials was widespread.[89]
While these statements are more of an indirect nature and thus do not conclusively prove the existence of gas chambers, their significance against MGK’s belief of resettlement is trebled as these would constitute some of the best sources for their case. Indeed, as there was no coherent defense of resettlement offered by any Nazi defendants in their postwar trials, or any other relevant statements, it is rather absurd that MGK wish to defend something that the Nazis didn’t even bother with even when their lives and legacy depended on it.[90] Indeed, if resettlement were a reality one would expect informative statements from numerous groups of sources, such as German witnesses, including the entire SS/Police hierarchy, as well as Slavic eyewitnesses from Ukraine and Belarus (at least since 1991 with the break-up of the Soviet Union). The reason for this should be fairly obvious, as no such evacuation program took place. As will be shown in the next three sections, the hopeful resettlement sites that MGK fantasize about were anything but in reality.

[34] MGK, Sobibór, p.106.
[35] See the section Hypocritical Use of Witness Evidence, Chapter 6.
[36] MGK, Sobibór, p.106.
[37] Some articles cited by Kues in part II, section 3.1 of his series: 1943 American Jewish Yearbook, “sent farther east”; 1944 American Jewish Yearbook, “occupied Soviet territories,”; October 1942 Israelitisches Wochenblatt für die Schweiz, “occupied Russian territory,” “other destinations”; November 1942 Israelitisches Wochenblatt für die Schweiz, “former Polish-Russian border zone,” June 1943 New York Times, communiqué from Belgian exile government stating Belgian Jews sent to concentration camps in Germany, Poland, and occupied Russian territories.
[38] Jason Myers, ‘MGK’s Distortion of a Source in support of ‘Resettlement’,’ Holocaust Controversies, 2.6.11,
[39] Kues, ‘Evidence, Part II,’ 3.1.3.
[40] See Kues, ‘Evidence, Part II,’ 3.2.2 - 3.2.3. Kues cites them to show European Jews in the Baltics that ‘should not have been there’ without resettlement. The possibility of the Baltics serving as a resettlement site will be looked at in some depth later on.
[41]Eugene M. Kulischer, The Displacement of Population in Europe, Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943.  For further debunking of the Kulischer gambit, see Roberto Muehlenkamp, ‘«Evidence for the Presence of "Gassed" Jews in the Occupied Eastern Territories» (3, 1),’ Holocaust Controversies, 15.6.10,
[42] Despite M&G’s claim that Kulischer never spoke of an extermination policy against the Jews (M&G, Treblinka, 273), on p.111 of his The Displacement of Population in Europe, Kulischer wrote that “It is hardly possible to distinguish how far the changes in the Jewish population of the General Government are due to deportation and how far they are attributable to "ordinary" mortality and extermination. Moreover, the number of Jews remaining in the General Government is in any case uncertain.” Emphasis added.
[43] M&G, Treblinka, p.268.
[44] Kulischer, The Displacement, p.4.
[45] Eugene Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947, New York: Columbia University, 1948, p.279.
[46] MGK, Sobibór, pp.334-344 (3,298 words of quotes from Kulischer); M&G, Treblinka, pp.268-273 (1,515 words); Kues, ‘Evidence, Part 1,’ 3.2.1 (344 words).
[47] Aynat, ‘Considérations sur la déportation des juifs de France et de Belgique à l'est de l'Europe en 1942,’ Akribeia, 2, March 1998, pp.5-59. The scant earlier references (such as in Sanning or Werner) regarded issues tertiary to direct resettlement.
[48] Boisdefeu, ‘La Controverse Sur L’Extermination Des Juifs Pas Les Allemands.’
[49] David Hoggan, The Myth of the Six Million,, 1969, p.37.
[50] Cf. Carlo Mattogno, ‘Belzec or the Holocaust Controversy of Roberto Muehlenkamp’: “If there were documents on “at least 434,000 Jews” being transported from Belzec “to the east”, the controversy which has caused me to write my study would not exist: Belzec would unquestionably be considered nothing more than a transit camp”; “Regarding their precise destination (of Jewish deportees to the East) there exist – as noted by me – no documentation, but there are several indications, as shown in my book on Treblinka, and in particular the sixth section of Chapter VIII.”
[51] See Chapter 3.
[52] M&G, Treblinka, pp.247-250; MGK, Sobibór, p.294.
[53] Czech, Kalendarium, passim. Of course, those not selected were gassed.
[54] Dannecker’s 21 July 1942 record of a prior telephone conversation with Adolf Eichmann records that “as soon as transportation into the General Gouvernement is again possible, transports of children can get moving.” Trial of Adolf Eichmann file T/37(26), Minutes by Eichmann and Dannecker on their discussion concerning the deportation of Jews from France; Paris, 1.7.1942, RF1223, also T/429. As argued in Graf, ‘Insights on the 1944 Deportations of Hungarian Jews’; M&G, Treblinka, p.251;  MGK, Sobibór, p.295; Mattogno, Auschwitz The Case for Sanity, p.654.
[55] See Günther’s 13 August 1942 telegram to SS officials in Paris regarding the deportation of Jewish children, where he states that such children could “gradually be deported to Auschwitz”, T/443.
[56] Roethke to Eichmann reporting the departure of a train from Le Bourget-Drancy to Auschwitz with 1,000 Jews, Paris, 14.8.42, T/444.
[57] IV J, Abstellung von rollendem Material fuer Judentransporte, 13.5.1942, gez. Dannecker, in Serge Klarsfeld (ed), Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich. Deutsche Dokumente 1941–1944. Paris, 1977, p.56 (CDJC XXVb-29), also in Hilberg, Sonderzüge nach Auschwitz, pp.153-4.
[58] The document is also cited as evidence of resettlement by Graf, ‘Insights on the 1944 Deportations of Hungarian Jews.’
[59] Report of the SS-Untersturmführer Horst Ahnert of 1 September 1942, T/451. The document has been cited in M&G, Treblinka, p.251; Mattogno, Hilberg, p.74.
[60] As discussed on Day 26 of the Irving-Lipstadt trial, the eigth point of the document read: “When can we count on the construction of the barracks of the Düsseldorf camp? Has construction already been commenced? Where exactly will the camp be situated?" See the trial transcripts for p.46, available at:
[61] Cf. Kurt Pätzold and Erika Schwarz, Auschwitz war mich nur ein Bahnhof,  Berlin: Metropol 1994. It is likely from this point that able-bodied Jews could be sent to Auschwitz or other necessary destinations, while non-capable Jews could be sent to other destinations.
[62] Cf. MGK, Sobibór, p.291, pp.296-297, p.298, p.326; M&G, Treblinka, p.230, p.237, p.248, p.290.
[63] MGK, Sobibór, p.358.
[64] Ibid., pp.367-368; Kues, ‘Evidence, Part I,’ 3.3.1.
[65] MGK, Sobibór, p.361.
[66] Kues, ‘Evidence, Part I,’ 3.3.7.
[67] Kues, ‘Evidence, Part II,’ 3.3.14.
[68] MGK, Sobibór, p.361.
[69] Kues, ‘Evidence, Part I,’ fn. 1.
[70] M&G, Treblinka, pp.191-199, 241; MGK, Sobibór, pp.214-215, 348.
[71] MGK, Sobibór, p.307.
[72] Ibid., p.353; Kues, ‘Evidence, Part I,’ 2.5.
[73] RBD Königsberg, Fahrplananordnung Nr. 62, 13.7.42, NARB 378-1-784, p.234.
[74] This estimate is based on approximations of 200,000 people from Distrikt Bialystok (to Auschwitz and Treblinka), 250,000 from Distrikt Galizien (to Auschwitz and Belzec), several thousand from Reichskommissariat Ostland (to Sobibor), at least 10,000 from Thrace (to Treblinka), 30,000 from Regierungsbezir Ziechenau (to Auschwitz), and about 16,000  from Distrikt Krakau (to Auschwitz).  
[75] Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, pp.131-137; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, pp.723-743.
[76] M&G, Treblinka, p.289.
[77] See section ‘The Lublin Labour/Extermination Camp Complex in 1943’ in Chapter 3.
[78] Alfred Mierzejewski, Most Valuable Asset of the Reich: A History of the German National Railway, Volume 2: 1933-1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000, p.123.This fact also refutes MGK’s hope that the Höfle figure of Majdanek arrivals in the last two weeks of 1942 (12,761) were transported to the east. MGK, Sobibór, p.324.
[79] Sergey Romanov, ‘The Number of Hungarian Jews Gassed Upon Arrival at Auschwitz,’ Holocaust Controversies, 2.12.09,
[80] Peter Myers, ‘The Fatal Flaw in Holocaust Denial,’ Neither Aryan Nor Jew, February 6, 2009,
[81] MGK, Sobibór, p.352.
[82] Greiser an Pohl 14.2.44, NO-519.
[83] Graf, ‘Insights on the 1944 Deportations of Hungarian Jews’; Carlo Mattogno, ‘Die Deportation ungarischer Juden von Mai bis Juli 1944,’ VffG Vol. 5 No. 4 (2001). Graf said in 2000 that “One of the most crucial unsolved problems is the question of where the unemployable Hungarian Jews were billeted,” and that “under the present circumstances, it is of course not possible to determine the number of victims among the deported Hungarian Jews, but it was probably on the order of several tens of thousands.” Mattogno, in a section titled ‘what was the fate of unfit Hungarian Jews?’, says “The current state of knowledge does not allow us to answer this question with certainty and supported by documents.”
[84] MGK, Sobibór, p.353. Kues, ‘Evidence, Part I,’ 2.2.3 repeats similar points, including an extension to all Jews deported to Auschwitz in 1944, see fn 15.
[85] Germar Rudolf, Rudolf Report: Expert Report on Chemical and Technical Aspects of the ‘Gas Chambers’ of Auschwitz, Chicago: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2003, pp.270-271.
[86] Arthur Butz, “A Reply to Jürgen Graf: On the 1944 Deportations of Hungarian Jews,” Journal of Historical Review, 19/4, p.19.
[87] If Mannl’s chronology is correct (easily could be off by a year due to memory lapse), then a 1942 statement would refer to gassings in Crematorium I in the main camp.
[88] This was SSPF Georg Michalsen, who was sentenced to 12 years by a court in Hamburg in 1974; see JuNSV Bd. XXXIX, Nr. 812; cf. Angrick, ‘Georg Michalsen’.
[89] Mierzejewski, Most Valuable Asset of the Reich, pp.124-126, citing Uchmann, Interrogation of Walter Mannl, 4 Js 564/64, Siegburg, 24.4.1967, ZSL II 206 AR-Z 15/1963, vol. 4, f. 477.; Schwedersky, Interrogation of Eduard Kryschak, UR I 21/59, Bremen, 12.12.1960, pp. 2–3, ZSL 208 AR-Z 230/59, vol. 7, ff. 1526–27.; Schwedersky, Interrogation of Hans Prause, UR I 4/67 (G), Düsseldorf, 9.10.1968, pp. 1, 4, ZSL 208 AR-Z 230/59, vol. 15, ff. 4274, 4277.; Landgericht Düsseldorf, Interrogation of Richard Neuser, UR I 21/59, Siegen, 4.7.1961, p. 2, ZSL 208 AR-Z 230/59, f. 1835.; Anklageschrift Ganzenmüller, 8 Js 430/67, p. 291, ZSL VI (420) 107 AR-Z 80/61. Cf. further examples in Hilberg, Sonderzüge nach Auschwitz, pp. 95, 98-105.
[90] This has not come to pass despite available opportunities, such as Eichmann’s statements in an interview to the sympathetic Sassen. On Eichmann’s interviews with Sassen, see Wojak, Eichmanns Memoiren; David Cesarani, Eichmann: His Life and Crimes, London, 2004.

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