Sunday, December 25, 2011

Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. Chapter 2: Nazi Policy (2). Extermination of Soviet Jews, June 1941-March 1942.

Extermination of Soviet Jews, June 1941-March 1942

During the planning stages for Operation Barbarossa, Nazi food policy was linked to plans for large-scale political killing. On May 2, 1941, a conference of state secretaries, chaired by Thomas, had concluded that "umpteen million people will doubtless starve to death, if we extract everything necessary for us from the country.”[10] The selection of these starvation victims would follow a political economy of racial value, but would also be shaped by a political-ideological-racial belief that the enemy was the ‘Jewish-Marxist.’ Rosenberg recognised this linkage when he wrote, on May 8, 1941, that the war would be:
[a] fight for the food supply and raw materials for the German Reich as well as for Europe as a whole, a fight ideological in nature in which the last Jewish-Marxist enemy has to be defeated.[11]
The specific demographic consequences anticipated in this planning were spelled out in a report by the Agriculture Group on May 23, 1941, based on recommendations by Backe. The USSR would be split into two (a productive and an unproductive zone) and surplus populations redirected to Siberia, even though “railway transportation is out of the question”:
There is no German interest in maintaining the productive capacity of these regions, also in what concerns the supplies of the troops stationed there. […] The population of these regions, especially the population of the cities, will have to anticipate a famine of the greatest dimensions. The issue will be to redirect the population to the Siberian areas. As railway transportation is out of the question, this problem will also be an extremely difficult one.[12]
The report then admitted that “Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia.” The document tellingly referred to these groups as “useless eaters”, a phrase originally used to justify killing the mentally ill in the T4 program, thereby confirming that euthanasia terminology had spread to these planners. However, if there was no rail transport to take them to Siberia, the latter option was already a dubious one, so this document could be viewed as an early admission that death was at the forefront of Nazi intentions for the Soviet population, with Jews at the front of the queue. This is further confirmed by a document by Engelhardt[13], which included a table of nationalities by town and country in Belorussia, on which Waldemar von Poletika had underlined Jews, Russians and Poles and added a marginal note saying 'starve!' Another part of the same text had a marginal note by von Poletika saying that a population of 6.3 million people would die.
     Hunger planning was reiterated after the invasion. On August 14, 1941, Göring "reckoned with great loss of life on grounds of nutrition.”[14] On November 13, 1941, Wagner confirmed that “non-working prisoners of war in the prison camps are to starve.”[15] In November, Göring told the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano:
This year, 20 to 30 million people will die of hunger in Russia. Perhaps it is a good thing that this is happening, because certain peoples must be decimated.[16]
     During the summer of 1941, starvation policy was conjoined with a more active shooting policy, partially justified by the concept of reprisal and partly by a conflation of all male Jews with Bolshevism. In March 1941, Göring had told Heydrich to draft a warning to the troops “so that they would know whom in practice to put up against the wall.”[17] On June 17, 1941, Heydrich held a meeting with the unit commanders of the Einsatzgruppen in Berlin, giving instructions for the units to follow after the invasion. On July 2, 1941, he passed on a summary of these instructions to the four HSSPF. He explicitly listed “Jews in party and state positions” as a group to be executed, and also called for the incitement of pogroms, euphemistically dubbed "self-cleansing attempts" (Selbstreinigungsversuchen), but "without trace" (spurenlos) of German involvement.[18] These instructions placed all Jewish men in peril, especially those within pre-1939 Soviet borders, whom Nazi ideology automatically assumed to be Bolsheviks. Among the first men in the firing line were any educated Jewish males, such as the Lwow males killed in the “intelligentsia action” of early July. Einsatzgruppe C reported Leaders of Jewish intelligentsia (in particular teachers, lawyers, Soviet officials) liquidated.”[19] Einsatzgruppe B noted that "In Minsk, the entire Jewish intelligentsia has been liquidated (teachers, professors, lawyers, etc. except medical personnel)."[20] Lutsk, Ukraine, witnessed an early example of the hugely disproportionate application of reprisals:
On July 2 the corpses of 10 German Wehrmacht soldiers were found. In retaliation, 1160 Jews were shot by the Ukrainians with the help of one platoon of the police and one platoon of the infantry.[21]
The Germans did not recognize the concept of ‘proportionality’ that applies to reprisals in international law, which requires that “Acts done by way of reprisals must not, however, be excessive and must not exceed the degree of violation committed by the enemy.”[22] By October, one military leader, Reichenau, was calling for a “tough but just atonement of Jewish Untermenschentum.”[23]  Nazi desires to wreak vengeance against Jews therefore converged, in the East, with a military culture in which vengeance actions were already inclined to seek unlimited total solutions.[24] This context is totally ignored by MGK, and systematically misrepresented by deniers who discuss reprisal policy.[25]
As a result of this vengeance culture, in addition to the central momentum of Heydrich’s pre-war orders, but without a general extermination order for the Jewish population prior to the invasion, anti-Jewish measures in the Soviet Union were driven by locally initiated ad-hoc killings for the first months of the occupation, characterized by a high degree of co-operation between the Wehrmacht and the SS.[26] For example, the northern sector of the occupied territories, an area patrolled by Franz Stahlecker’s Einsatzgruppen A, and under the responsibility of HSSPF Hans Adolf Prützmann, became the source of a crucial local initiative. After a fifteen hour battle over the small Lithuanian border town of Garsden, which cost the lives of around 100 German soldiers, the German border police unit “Stapo Tilsit” and the Tilsit-SD (security police) contingent moved into the area. As the town’s Jews were accused of aiding the Soviet troops during the battle, police leader Hans-Joachim Böhme and SD-commander Werner Hersmann ordered the arrest of 201 Jews on June 23, and immediately sought their execution. Following a discussion with Stahlecker, who gave his “basic agreement concerning the cleansing operation”, the next day (June 24) the 201 Jews, including a woman, were executed. Following their work in Garsden, Böhme’s newly titled “Einsatzkommando (EK) Tilsit” conducted similar killings, predominantly of Jews, in the nearby towns of Krottingen (June 25, 214 people) and Polangen (June 27, 111 people); both were reprisal measures for guerrilla activities.[27] Heydrich and Himmler, in their June 30 tour of Grodno, “approved in full” the measures of EK Tilsit.[28] By July 18, EK Tilsit had murdered 3,302 victims (mostly military-aged Jewish men) in their border-area cleansing operations[29], an undertaking which was not ordered by any central SS figure, but instead was initiated by a lowly police official.
The actions of EK Tilsit were, however, capitalized upon by the higher SS leaders in order to radicalize their other units. The day after meeting with Böhme and sanctioning his proposed executions, Stahlecker met with the leader of Sonderkommando (SK) 1a, Martin Sandberger, and advised him to carry out matters in his area “along the same lines” as Böhme. As Sandberger’s unit pressed forward to Estonia, it began shooting communists and adult Jewish males. Following Stahlecker’s briefing of the commander of SK 1b, its men also began liquidating selected racial and political enemies. In addition, Böhme established contact with the commander of EK 3, Karl Jäger.          
Following the pre-war instructions by Heydrich on encouraging and initiating native pogroms, up to ten thousand Lithuanian Jews were killed in such actions just days after the German invasion. In Latvia, which was fully occupied by mid-July, similar pogroms occurred, but not to the same extent as those in Lithuania. In some cases, no German involvement was needed to precipitate such horror; in Kaunas, for instance, nearly 4,000 Jews were spontaneously murdered immediately after the Soviet withdrawal.[30] These pogroms helped fuel and radicalize the Einsatzgruppen’s own actions in the region; it was no coincidence that the commander of Einsatzkommando 3, Jäger, began his unit’s slaughter of Jews in Kaunas, murdering nearly 3,000 Jews and Jewesses in the city in early July, a number which undoubtedly included more than just “Jews in party and state positions.”   
An expansion of killing to include women and children resulted, in part, organically from such local initiatives, and partly from the realisation that food supply was very limited and that it would be very difficult to feed both the Wehrmacht and the civilian population.[31] The expansion was authorized explicitly by Hitler on July 16, 1941, when, at a meeting with top Nazi leaders, he stressed his desire to create a Garden of Eden in the East by “All necessary measures – shootings, resettlement, etc.” - and hinted that troops and police should now take the lead in “shooting anyone even looks sideways at us.”[32] The following day, Heydrich issued Einsatzbefehl No. 8 on the weeding out of prisoners for “special treatment”, clearly meaning execution:
Above all, the following must be discovered : all important functionaries of State and Party, especially professional revolutionaries ... all People’s Commissars in the Red Army, leading personalities of the State ... leading personalities of the business world, members of the Soviet Russian Intelligence, all Jews, all persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical Communists. Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp ... The prisoners are to be taken for special treatment if possible into the former Soviet Russian territory.[33]
Escalation was also clear in the Ostland and in Ukraine. After the German Blitzkrieg failed to bring immediate victory over the USSR, it became apparent that there would not be enough food to meet all demands: German domestic demand, Wehrmacht supply demand and the nutrition of captured civilians. In the area of Army Group North (including the Baltic states), this resulted in almost immediate radicalization. On July 20, 1941, Vilnius and Kaunas between them only had stocks of 5,000 to 6,000 tonnes of grain, yet in August the Wehrmacht took 6,500 tonnes, leaving the stocks essentially empty.[34] Troops thus then had to take provisions directly from the land.
     It is thus highly significant that, when the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment was preparing to sweep the Pripet Marshes, it received an "explicit order" (ausdrüklicher Befehl des RF-SS) from Himmler on August 1, 1941 to kill women and children through drowning: "All Jews must be shot. Drive the female Jews into the swamp."[35] Magill’s reply stated that “the swamps were not so deep that a sinking under could occur."[36] In the Baltic region, Stahlecker wrote a draft on August 6, 1941, that rejected Lohse’s ghettoization proposals of July 27 and proposed instead that policy should focus on “the radical possibilities for dealing with the Jewish Problem” that had “emerged for the first time in the Ostland.” He referred to “general orders from above that cannot be discussed in writing,”[37] and stated that, unlike in the GG, “Perspectives derived from the need to use the Jews for labour will simply not be relevant for the most part in the Ostland.”[38] Stahlecker was silent on the fate of non-working Jews, but stated that the small number of working Jews would be subject to a “ruthless exploitation” that would produce “a significant easing of the later transportation of Jews.” This could only mean that non-working Jews were already to be killed immediately whilst working Jews were to be decimated by forced labour to leave only a rump that would have to be resettled later. In many ways, this foreshadowed the Wannsee Protocol.
Stahlecker’s intentions clearly reached the head of EK 3, Karl Jäger. Beginning on August 15, 1941, Jäger's statistics demonstrate a sharp increase in the number of Jews being shot and the inclusion of large numbers of Jewish women and children.[39] Meanwhile, an OKW file document revealed the first intimations that gassing was an option being considered in the Ostland.[40]
Stahlecker’s view of decimation by labour was shared by Einsatzgruppen C leader Otto Rasch. In August, Rasch advocated the use of Jews in the Pripet marches.[41] On September 17, Rasch[42] suggested that an “extensive labour utilization” should be used to achieve a “gradual liquidation of the Jews.”[43]
Rasch’s zone, Ukraine, witnessed the largest early massacres, but these were mainly instigated by HSSPF Jeckeln, who had assumed operational control of killing forces. In August, 23,600 Jews, many of whom had been expelled from Hungary, were killed at Kamenets-Podolsky. Their fate was sealed in a meeting headed by the Quartermaster-General Wagner and the Chief of Military Administration, Schmidt von Altenstadt.[44] In September, the execution of 33,771 Jews at Babi Yar, Kiev, was carried out “[in] cooperation with the HQ of EGC and two Kommandos of Police Regiment South” whilst in Zhitomir, 3,145 Jews were registered and shot.[45] In the latter action, "The women were allowed to hold their children in their arms" during the shooting.[46]
The civilian administration in the Ostland joined the systematic killing policy in September. On September 3, Gewecke noted the need “to liquidate all Jews” across the ‘Schaulen’ [Siauliai] region.[47] Postwar testimony indicates they were killed as “useless eaters”, the same formulation earlier used to justify killing T4 patients.[48] The language was repeated by Erren in Slonim, Belorussia, when 7,000 Jews were shot: “The action carried out by the SD on 13 November rid me of unnecessary mouths to feed.”[49]
Extermination was also mandated by the assumption, expressed for example by von Bechtolsheim, that “without a single exception, Jews and partisans are an identical concept.”[50] This statement, with its use of ‘concept’, demonstrates that the Jew-partisan linkage was established in the minds of the Wehrmacht leaders before they invaded the USSR, but it was also intensified into more systematic killing actions as the war proceeded. Moreover, Bechtolsheim’s order that Jews had to “vanish from the flat land and the Gypsies too have to be exterminated”[51] was issued before there was any partisan threat in Belorussia. Indeed, the fact that Gypsies also had to be exterminated shows that Bechtolsheim was using military prerogatives to carry out extermination of groups he defined by race. Bechtolsheim’s Befehl Nr. 24 put in writing what his forces had already been doing in conjunction with Reserve Battalion 11, sent from Lithuania, which killed 11,400 men, women and children in massacres that spanned Slutsk, Kletsk, Kliniki, Smilovichi, Kojdanov and the Minsk civilian prisoner camp.[52] The civil administration expressed shock at these murders.[53]
In November, Georg Thomas called for the “complete extermination of the Jews” in Volhynia (in western Ukraine) on the grounds that Jews were “without any doubt less valuable as labourers compared with the damage they do as ‘germ carriers’ of communism.”[54] On December 18, 1941, Braütigam told Lohse that “economic considerations” (referred to by Lohse in earlier correspondence of November 15) “should fundamentally remain unconsidered.” Furthermore, he stated that this had probably been agreed via verbal discussion, thereby confirming that policy was not always being conveyed by written order but instead by mouth.[55] On January 10, 1942, Himmler confirmed to Rosenberg that “measures to eliminate Jews shall be taken without regard to economic consequences.”[56]         
In summary, by the time the top Nazi leadership decided to deport European Jews to death camps, the fate of Soviet Jews had already been sealed and large numbers of women and children were already documented as killed in the Nazis’ own reports. For example, in early 1942, only 22,767 Jews remained alive, according to a census, in the military occupied zone of eastern Belorussia.[57] In the area of Einsatzgruppe A, Stahlecker reported in January 1942 that “The systematic mopping up of the Eastern Territories embraced, in accordance with the basic orders, the complete removal if possible, of Jewry” and that this had resulted inthe execution up to the present time of 229,052 Jews.”[58] He noted that in Latvia, “Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed by these Sonderkommandos.” He then related how “27,800 were executed in Riga at the beginning of December 1941” by Jeckeln’s forces.
Stahlecker then detailed killings in Lithuania, where “136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single actions.” Total Jewish deaths in Ukraine in 1941, including eastern Galicia and territory occupied by Rumania, have been estimated at 509,190.[59] For the ‘White Russian Sector’, Stahlecker noted:
41,000 Jews have been shot up to now. This number does not include those shot in operations by the former Einsatzkommandos. From estimated figures about 19,000 partisans and criminals, that is in the majority Jews, were shot by the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] up to December 1941.
The academic literature on these killings emphasizes the Einsatzgruppen's utilization of large numbers of Order Police and native auxiliaries.[60] This is especially true of the studies of the actions of Einsatzgruppe A and its collaborators in Lithuania[61], Latvia[62] and Estonia.[63]
Further killings in White Ruthenia in the winter of 1941-42 were only delayed by the frozen ground and by Kube’s attempts to delay the shooting of deported Reich Jews. On January 31, 1942, Hofmann noted that “At present a complete liquidation of the Jews is not possible due to the frost, because the ground is too frozen to dig pits which would then be available as mass graves for the Jews.” Hofmann promised, however, that "in the spring large-scale executions would be initiated again."[64] These killings are discussed later in this chapter.
In Ukraine, killings continued through the winter of 1941-42, as shown by the gassing of Jews with Lorpicrin to clear the Zlatopol ghetto in Nikolayev on the orders of the county commissar.[65] Gas vans were used in Simferopol, as confirmed in the trial of Drexel and Kehrer of EK 12a and 12b.[66] German court cases against German officers who overstepped their duties or used unauthorized killing methods show that the purpose of the Security Police was defined as the extermination of Jews. A group of documents[67] describes the massacre of Jewish prisoners in Poltava military prison on March 25, 1942. SS-Obersturmführer Schulte (who at the time was a liaison officer between the 6th army high command and Sonderkommando 4a) explained that he had to execute several prisoners, but didn't have an authority for special treatment (Sonderbehandlung) of “NKVD commissars, Communist elements and Jews”, and therefore he requested Unteroffizier Hans Röttgermann[68] to perform the special treatment.[69] According to Schulte some space in the frozen pits was available, so Röttgermann could proceed.
In his May 31, 1942 report[70] Röttgermann explained that on March 25 he was asked by Gefreiter der Feldgendarmerie Konrad Neese, to whom Röttgermann had previously given the prisoners to perform some tasks, to arrive in the prison yard, since the Jews refused to work and were threatening Neese. Röttgermann ordered the Jews to work, and when they refused he used a rubber stick. Röttgermann alleged that because of that two Jewish “commissars” threatened him with wooden logs. He shot them and other 6 Jews, as allegedly they asked him to shoot them too, which he proceeded to do. Röttgermann writes that he has in possession Schulte's order for execution of these Jews on that same date. In order to simplify things, Röttgermann shot two Jewish women right in the yard.
Röttgermann was arrested on April 3, 1942 and accused of neglecting official orders and undermining the authority of the Germans in Ukraine. The verdict of the court-martial (Feldkriegsgericht) after the proceedings which took place on April 17, 1942 under Kriegsgerichtsrat Dietzel (from Poltava Kommandantur), stated, in part:
Therefore shootings of Jews, which lately have been a task of SD, are acts of the state [Akte des Staates], ordered for extermination of these enemies in a certain manner [der die Austilgung dieser Feinde in einer bestimmten Art und Weise anordnet] and performed in this manner. In order to implement these measures, which the state deems to be necessary, special organs are used. These organs are subject to strict guidelines.
[...]Thereby it is guaranteed that the acts of the state are implemented within the limits set by the state. The military implements altogether different tasks. It is not a permissible interpretation that duties of specific military men are defined by their belonging to SS and that under any circumstances they implement the tasks of SS or SD.[...]The accused shall be punished for lack of discipline.By shooting 10 Jews in the military prison he failed to follow the order of his direct military commander lieutenant Lutzke.  Due to this lack of discipline the accused caused severe harm. This means severe undermining of the German military and reputation of Germans in Ukraine in general.When weighing any exculpatory circumstances it should be taken into account that liquidation of Jews [die Beseitigung der Juden] should not harm the Germans' authority since for these measures there are guidelines given by the state. This especially pertains to the SD activities, since they implement these measures within these guidelines.[71]
This court case therefore followed a similar pattern to that against Täubner of the Waffen-SS 1.SS-Inf.Brig. (mot), who was investigated by an SS court in 1942 for excessively cruel acts during the killing of at least 319 Jews in Novohrad-Volynsky (Zhitomir oblast), 191 Jews in Sholokhovo (Dnepr. oblast), 459 in Aleksandriia (Kirovograd oblast). The court reached the following verdict:
The accused shall not be punished because of the actions against the Jews as such. The Jews have to be exterminated and none of the Jews that were killed is any great loss. Although the accused should have recognized that the extermination of the Jews was the duty of Kommandos which were set up especially for this purpose, he should be excused for considering himself to have the authority to take part in the extermination of Jewry himself. Real hatred of the Jews was the driving motivation for the accused. In the process he let himself be drawn into committing cruel actions in Alexandriya which are unworthy of a German man and an SS-officer. These excesses cannot be justified, either, as the accused would like to, as retaliation for the pain that the Jews have caused the German people. It is not the German way to apply Bolshevik methods during the necessary extermination of the worst enemy of our people. In so doing the conduct of the accused gives rise to considerable concern. The accused allowed his men to act with such vicious brutality that they conducted themselves under his command like a savage horde...[72]
Himmler had advised the tribunal in instructions issued on his behalf by Bender on October 26, 1942 that “Execution for purely political motives shall result in no punishment, unless this is necessary for maintaining discipline and order.”[73] Himmler thus saw the murder of Jews as political killing justified by the policy of the state, namely the Final Solution.  
MGK’s three main responses to the mass shootings in the USSR are to ignore the mass of evidence, selectively quote a small number of documents in a misleading manner, and lie about the work of legitimate historians. For example, in a book attacking Raul Hilberg, Graf uses quotes by Hilberg that refer to the personnel composition of the Einsatzgruppen, whilst misrepresenting the instances where Hilberg discusses killings by other agencies and emphasizes the Einsatzgruppen's utilization of large numbers of Order Police and native auxiliaries.[74] This misrepresentation is in part due to Mattogno and Graf’s massive ignorance of the huge literature on the subject of police battalions, the origins of which stretch back to Reitlinger in 1953[75]; but in many cases, it can be shown to be deliberate, because Graf refers to specific killings that Hilberg discusses in inter-agency terms. Graf wants the reader to believe that Hilberg is claiming these were exclusively Einsatzgruppen killings, when Hilberg's text actually says the opposite. Graf sets up his strawman as follows:
The claimed numbers of victims of the Einsatzgruppen are impossibly large. The largest of the four, Einsatzgruppe A, had 990 members. If we subtract from this the 172 vehicle drivers, 3 women employees, 51 interpreters, 3 teletypewriter operators and 8 radio operators, there are about 750 combatants left to use for the mass killings (p. 303; DEJ, p. 289). Up to 15th October 1941, Einsatzgruppe A supposedly killed 125,000 Jews (p. 309; DEJ, p. 289). Considering the fact that the mass murders first began in August (p. 307; DEJ, na), the overwhelming majority of the 125,000 victims, let us say 120,000, must have been killed in a period of ten weeks.[76]
Graf's decision to focus on Einsatzgruppe A is a tactical error on his part, because even a reader with minimal Holocaust knowledge will be aware that this unit operated in Lithuania[77], Latvia[78] and Estonia[79] with the largest proportion of native collaborators. Moreover, Graf himself discusses the involvement of native Baltic citizens in pogroms:
In addition, thousands of Jews were killed in pogroms initiated by the native populations following the German invasion. After they had been freed from the Bolshevist yoke, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and others took revenge on Jews because the Red terror machinery had been led mainly by Jews, and this retribution unfortunately fell also on Jews who had nothing to do with the Communist crimes.[80]
Graf is thus skewered by his contradictory aims. He wishes to show that the natives hated Jews, but, in order to maintain his Einsatzgruppen strawman, he also needs to claim that all killings must have been done by Einsatzgruppe A acting alone. Hilberg's actual text is clear that Einsatzgruppe A needed local assistance. Summarizing the actions of EK 2 in September 1941, documented by Jäger’s report, Hilberg notes that EK 2 was “augmented by a Latvian Sonderkommando of more than one hundred men (eventually two companies of three platoons each) under a Latvian with legal training and police experience, Viktor Arajs.” Graf quote-mines the "21 men" in Einsatzkommando 2 (Einsatzgruppe A) and adds a ludicrous exclamation mark to express his personal incredulity, but omits the fact that this action was led by the HSSPF, not the Einsatzgruppe. For Kiev, Hilberg notes that “two detachments of Order Police helped Einsatzkommando 4a in the Kiev massacre.” For Kamenets-Podolsky, Hilberg emphasizes that HSSPF Jeckeln’s “own staff company (Stabskompanie) did the shooting.”[81]
Graf has therefore lifted death figures from Hilberg without acknowledging that some of the killings were instigated by the Higher SS and Police Leaders and/or the Wehrmacht, and were sometimes carried out by forces that were often primarily non-Einsatzgruppen personnel. The size of these non-Einsatzgruppen personnel exposes even further the deep dishonesty of Graf’s position. During the summer of 1941, there were 21 Order Police battalions operating in the USSR.[82] By 1942, when the Order Police became stationery, their combined total would be just under 15,000 men. The HSSPF, from July 1941, had at their disposal the First SS Brigade and the SS Cavalry Brigade, which were assigned respectively to the areas of HSSPF Jeckeln (Russia South) and HSSPF Bach-Zelewski (Russia Center). The total manpower of these units was between 10,000 and 11,000 men.[83] The men assigned to Jeckeln killed more Jews in Ukraine in 1941 than did Einsatzgruppe C and D combined.[84]
Moreover, by far the largest numerical collections of killers were the non-German auxiliaries, known as Schutzmannschaft.[85] On July 1, 1942, these forces totaled 165,128 men.[86] It is therefore beyond dispute that the Nazis had enough men available to exterminate the Jews of the USSR. Graf is either ignorant or dishonest on this issue. 
Finally, it should be noted that Baltic and Ukrainian auxiliaries of the type ignored by Graf were later used in Aktion Reinhard to liquidate ghettos by deportation to the death camps or shooting on site. For example, Erich Kapke, who commanded a ghetto-clearing unit in the Radom district in the autumn of 1942, told investigators in 1968 that the unit had Ukrainian and Baltic manpower.[87]


[10] Aktennotiz über Ergebnis der heutigen. Besprechung mit den Staatssekretären über Barbarossa, 2.5.41, 2718-PS, IMT XXXI, pp.84-85; cf. Alex J. Kay, ‘Germany's Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1941’, Journal of Contemporary History, 41/4, October 2006, pp.685-700.
[11] Rosenberg, Allgemeine Instruktion für alle Reichskommissare in den besetzten Ostgebieten, 8.5.41, 1030-PS, IMT XXVI, pp.576-80.
[12] Wirtschaftspolitische Richtlinien für die Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost vom 23.5.1941, erarbeitet von der Gruppe Landwirtschaft, 23.5.41, EC-126, IMT XXXVI, pp.135-57.
[13] Eugen Freiherr von Engelhardt, Ernährung- und Landwirtschaft, p.11, NARA T84/225/1595914. Document was first discussed in Bernhard Chiari, ‘Deutsche Zivilverwaltung in Weissrussland 1941-1944. Die lokale Perspektive der Besatzungsgeschichte’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52, 1993 and most extensively in Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1942. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999, pp.57-8.
[14] Verbindungsstelle d. OKW/WiRüAmt beim Reichsmarschall, Wirtschaftsauszeichungen für die Berichtszeit vom 1-14.8.41 (u.früher), NARA T77/1066/1062; cf. Christopher R. Browning, 'A Reply to Martin Broszat regarding the Origins of the Final Solution', Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual 1, 1984, pp.113–32.
[15] AOK 18 Chef des Stabes, Merkpunkte aus der Chefbesprechung in Orscha am 13.11.41, NOKW-1535.
[16] Czeslaw Madajczyk (ed), ‘Generalplan Ost’, Polish Western Affairs III/2, 1962, pp.391-442.
[17] Browning, Path, p.236, citing Secret file note Heydrich (CdS B Nr. 3795/41), 26.3.41, RGVA 500-3-795, fols. 140-42.
[18] Heydrich an Jeckeln, von dem Bach-Zelewski, Prützmann, and Korsemann, 2.7.41, RGVA 500-1-25; cf.
Peter Klein, ed. Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42. Die Taetigskeits-und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Berlin: Edition Heinrich, 1997, pp.319-28.
[19] EM 13, 5.7.41.
[20] EM 32, 24.7.41.
[21] EM 24, 16.7.41.
[22] Michael A. Musmanno, U.S.N.R, Military Tribunal II, Case 9: Opinion and Judgment of the Tribunal. Nuremberg: Palace of Justice, 8.4.48, pp.106-108, citing the British Manual of Military Law, paragraph 459.
[23] AOK 6 Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, 10.10.41, published in Gerd R. Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds), “Unternehmen Barbarossa”. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion. Frankfurt am Main, 1991, p.285ff.
[24] Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. London, 2005.
[25] For an attempt by two deniers to whitewash the reprisal policy, falsely claiming that “most of the German reactions were totally covered by international law”, see ‘Dipl.-Chem.’ Germar Rudolf and Sibylle Schröder, ‘Partisan War and Reprisal Killings’, The Revisionist 1/3, 2003, pp.321-330:
[26] For overviews of Wehrmacht-SS cooperation, see Johannes Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer.Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006, pp.509-599; Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008, pp.243-282.
[27] Report of Stapo Tilsit, 1.7.41, RGVA 500-1-758; cf. Konrad Kwiet, ‘Rehearsing for Murder: The Beginning of the Final Solution in Lithuania in June 1941,’ HGS 12/1, 1998, p. 5.
[28] Peter Witte et al (eds), Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42. Hamburg: Christians, 1999.
[29] EM 26, 18.7.41.
[30] EM 19, 11.7.41.
[31] Christian Gerlach, ‘German Economic Interests, Occupation Policy, and the Murder of Jews in Belorussia, 1941/3’ in Ulrich Herbert (ed), National Socialist Extermination Policies. Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies. London, 2000, pp.210-39; Christoph Dieckmann, ‘The War and the Killing of the Lithuanian Jews’, in Ulrich Herbert (ed), National Socialist Extermination Policies. Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies. London, 2000, pp.240-75.
[32] Vermerk über die Besprechung am 16.7.1941, L-221, IMT XXXVIII, pp.86-94.
[33] Einsatzbefehl No. 8, 17.7.41, NO-3414; see also earlier draft, 28.6.41, 78-PS.
[34] Dieckmann, ‘The War and the Killing of the Lithuanian Jews’,p.256, citing statement of account of IV Wi AOK 18 relative to stocks on July 20, 1941, LVCA P 70-2-40 Bl.2 and statement of account re. Requirements of Army Group North (16th and 18th Armies, Panzergruppe 4) for meat, lard and flour in August and September 1941, LVCA P 70-1-16, Bl.39.
[35] Christopher R. Browning and Jürgen Matthäus, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942. London, 2004, p.310, citing Himmler order of 30.7.41 to SS Calvary Regiment 2, 1.8.41, BA-MA, RS 3-8/36; cf. JuNSV Bd. XX, Nr. 570.
[36] Magill report on the Pripet action, 12.8.41, MHA, Kommandostab des RFSS.
[37] These may have been issued during Himmler’s visit to Riga discussed in EM 48, 10.8.41, which also mentioned that “he intends to set up police formations consisting of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, etc., employing them outside of their own home areas,” implying an escalation of killing using native auxiliaries.
[38] Longerich, Holocaust, pp.232-34, citing Betrifft: Entwurf über die Aufstellung vorläufiger Richlinien für die Behandlung der Juden im Gebiet des Reichskommissariates Ostland, 6.8.41, LCHA.
[39] Jäger report of EK 3, 1.12.41, RGVA 500-1-25, p.115.
[40] Otto Dov Kulka und Eberhard Jäckel (eds), Die Juden in den geheimen Stimmungsberichten 1933-1945. Düsseldorf, 2004, p.454, citing Dok. 563, Reisebericht des Ia des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamts des OKW über seinen Besuch im Abschnitt der Wirtschaftsinspektion Nord, 11.8.41.
[41] EM 52, 14.8.41.
[42] As is discussed below, Rasch previously ran the Soldau camp in East Prussia and paid SK Lange to operate a gas van to kill mental patients at the site; see Rediess to Wolf, 7.11.1940, NO-2909; Rasch testimony to SS investigation of Soldau, 16.6.43, NO-1073.
[43] EM 86, 17.9.41.
[44] Vermerk über die im OKH stattgefundene Besprechung wegen Übernahme eines Teils der Ukraine in Zivilverwaltung am 27.8.1941 in Berlin, 197-PS; cf. Klaus-Michel Mallmann, ‘Der qualitative Sprung im Vernichtungsprozess. Das Massaker von Kamenez-Podolsk Ende August 1941’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 10, 2001, pp.237-64.
[45] EM 106, 7.10.41.
[46] Wendy Lower, ‘The ‘reibungslose' Holocaust? The German Military and Civilian Implementation of the ‘Final Solution' in Ukraine, 1941-1944,’ in Gerald Feldman and Wolfgang Seibel (eds), Networks of Nazi Persecution. Bureaucracy, Business and the Organization of the Holocaust. Berghahn, 2004, p.244; Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, pp.259-60.
[47] Gewecke, Jewish Concerns in Schaulen, 3.9.41, 3661-PS.
[48] Einsatzgruppen-Prozess Ulm, Urteil,  Ks 2/57, JuNSV Bd. XV, Nr. 465. Online http://www.holocaust-history.org/german-trials/einsatz-ulm.shtml .
[49] Status report, RC Slonim, 25.1.42, in Anklageschrift Erren et al., StA Hamburg 141 Js 173/61, p.50.
[50] Jürgen Förster, ‘The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination against the Soviet Union,’ Yad Vashem Studies 14, 1981, pp.7-33, citing Kommandant in Weissruthenien, Situation Report of February 1-15, 1942, BA-MA WK VII/527 RH 53 – 7/v. 206 RH 26-707/v. 1; cf. Hannes Heer, ‘Gustav Freiherr von Mauchenheim, gennant Bechtolsheim – ein Wehrmachtsgeneral als Organisator des Holocaust’ in Klaus-Michel Mallmann und Gerhard Paul (hg), Karrieren der Gewalt. Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004, pp.33-46; Browning, Origins, p.289; Peter Lieb, ‘Täter aus Überzeugung? Oberst Carl von Andrian und die Judenmorde der 707. Infanteriedivision 1941/42. Der Tagebuch eines Regimentskommandeurs: Ein neuer Zugang zu einer berüchtigten Wehrmachtdivision’, VfZ 50, 2002; Hannes Heer, Tote Zonen. Die Wehrmacht an der Ostfront. Hamburg, 1999; Hannes Heer, ‘Killing Fields: the Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia, 1941-42’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 11/1, 1997) pp.79-101.
[51] Kommandant in Weissruthenien Ia, Befehl Nr. 24, 24.11.41, gez. v. Bechtolsheim, NARB 378-1-698, p.32; cf. Browning, Origins, p.289.
[52] Kommandant in Belorussia, 8.10.41 and 16.10.41, NARB 378-1-698; cf. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, pp. 612-13. For Minsk, see EM 92, 23.9.41.
[53] Gebietskommissar Sluzk an Kube, 30.10.41, gez. Carl, 1104-PS, IMT XXVII, pp.4-8.
[54] EM 133, 14.11.41.
[55] Braütigam an Lohse, Jewish Question re. correspondence of 15 Nov. 1941, 18.12.41, 3666-PS, IMT XXXII, p.347.
[56] Himmler an Rosenberg, 10.1.42, NARA T454/154/334; cf. Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine. Chapel Hill, 2005, p.251.
[57] Beauftragter des RMO beim Befehlshaber rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Mitte. Bericht Nr. 6, 10.2.42, NARA T454/102/595.
[58] Stahlecker, Report of Einsatzgruppe A, n.d., 2273-PS.
[59] Alexander Kruglov, ‘Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941-1944’, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds), The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization. Bloomington, 2008, pp.278-79.
[60] Reitlinger, The Final Solution; Hans-Joachim Neufeldt, Jürgen Huck, Georg Tessin, Zur Geschichte des Ordungspolizeis 1936-1945. Koblenz, 1957; Andrej Angrick, Martina Vogt et al, ‘ ‘Da hätte man schon ein Tagebuch führen müssen’. Das Polizeibataillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte während des Sommers und Herbstes 1941’ in Helga Grabitz et al (eds), Die Normalität des Verbrechens. Festschrift für Wolfgang Scheffler. Berlin, 1994; Jürgen Matthäus, ‘What about the ‘Ordinary Men’? The German Order Police and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Union’, HGS 11, 1996, pp.134-150; Klaus-Michel Mallmann, ‘Vom Fussvolk der ‘Endlösung’. Ordnungspolizei, Ostkrieg und Judenmord’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte  XXVI, 1997; Edward B. Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions. Enforcing Racial War in the East. Kansas, 2005; Stefan Klemp, ‘Nicht ermittelt’. Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz – Ein Handbuch. Essen, 2005; Wolfgang Curilla, Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weissrussland 1941-1944. Paderborn, 2006; Erich Haberer, ‘The German police and genocide in Belorussia, 1941-1944: Part I: Police Deployment and Nazi genocidal directives. Part II: The ‘second sweep’: Gendarmerie killings of Jews and Gypsies on January 29, 1942. Part III: methods of genocide and the motives of German police compliance’, Journal of Genocide Research 3/1, pp.13-29, 3/2, pp.207-218, 3/3, pp.391-403.
[61] This is clearly spelt out in the Jäger report of EK 3, 1.12.41, RGVA 500-1-25, and in the secondary literature, cf. Dieckmann, ‘The War and the Killing of the Lithuanian Jews’, pp.240-75 and now Christoph Dieckmann, Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941-1944. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011; Wolfram Wette, Karl Jäger: Mörder der litauischen Juden. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2011; Petras Stankeras, Litovskie politseiskie batal'ony 1941-1945gg. Moscow: Veche, 2009; also in at least one well-known diary: Kazimierz Sakowicz, Ponary Diary, 1941-1943. A Bystander’s Account of a Mass Murder. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
[62] Margers Vestermanis, ‘Der lettische Anteil an der "Endloesung". Versuch einer Antwort’, in Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, Rainer Zitelmann (eds), Die Schatten der Vergangenheit. Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin: Propylaen, 1990; Andrew Ezergailis, The Holocaust in Latvia 1941-1944. The Missing Centre. Washington, DC, 1996; Katrin Reichelt, Lettland unter deutscher Besatzung 1941-1944. Der lettische Anteil am Holocaust. Berlin: Metropol, 2011; 'Unichtozhit' kak mozhno bol'she..' Latviiskie kollaboratsionistskie formirovaniia na territorii Belorussii, 1942-1944 gg. Sbornik dokumentov. Moscow: Fond 'Istoricheskii pamiat', 2009.
[63] Ruth Bettina Birn, ‘Collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Estonian Security Police’, Contemporary European History, 10/2, July 2001, pp.181-198; Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder Without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009.
[64] Protokoll über den Hergang der Hauptabteilungsleiter- und Abteilungsleiterbesprechung am 29.1.42, NARB 370-1-53, p.165.
[65] Fragment of a situation report from BdO Ukraine (gez. Müller-Brunkhorst), ca. March 1942 (title page missing); TsADAVOV, R-3676-4-317, p.71; cf. Dieter Pohl, ‘The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine’, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds) The Shoah in Ukraine, Bloomington, 2008, p.48.
[66] JuNSV Bd. XL, Nr. 816 StA Muenchen I, Az.119c Ks 6 a-b/70, Bl.33-35.
[67] Discovered by Sergey Romanov.
[68] Hans Röttgermann, 25.11.1900, Wesel (Kreis Düsseldorf) son of Johann Röttgermann and Maria (nee Bielefeld); plasterer; on 27.04.1922 married Helene Echte with whom had at least 4 children; took part in WWI as a volunteer;  joined NSDAP in 1932;  SS since 1932; in 1933 served in Papenburg concentration camp; Unteroffizier since 01.11.1941. Zugführer in SS-Sturm 8/19 [9/18?].
[69] Schulte to Thomas, 24.7.42, RGASPI 17-125-250, l. 13.
[70] RGASPI 17-125-250, l. 14.
[71] RGASPI 17-125-250, ll. 16-20.
[72] Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen and Volker Riess (eds), The Good Old Days, New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1988, pp.196-207; cf. JuNSV Bd. XLV, Nr. 877. The killings in Novohrad-Volynsky (Zviahel county, Zhitomir oblast; town is Zwiahel in Polish), 191 Jews in Sholokhovo (Dnepropetrovsk oblast), 459 in Aleksandriia (Kirovograd oblast) were documented in Einsatzbefehl Jeckeln an 1. SS-Brigade, 25.7.1941, NARA RG 242 T-501R 5/000 559-60; Cf. Dieter Pohl, ‘The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine’, p.28; Unsere Ehre heisst Treue. Kriegstagebuch des Kommandostabes Reichsführer SS. Tätigkeitsberichte der 1 und 2. SS-Infanterie-Brigade, der 1. SS-Kavallerie-Brigade und von Sonderkommandos der SS, Vienna, 1984, p.105ff; Kruglov, ‘Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941-1944’, p.276; Wendy Lower, ‘'On Him Rests the Weight of the Administration': Nazi Civilian Rulers and the Holocaust in Zhytomyr,’, in in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds) The Shoah in Ukraine, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008, p.240. The commissar for Zviahel County was Hans Schmidt, who was a Hauptscharführer in the SD.
[73] Beurteilung von Judenerscheissungen ohne Befehl und Befugnis, 26.10.42, NO-1744; Cf. Yehoshua Robert Büchler. ‘"Unworthy Behavior": The Case of SS Officer Max Täubner,’ HGS 17/3, 2003, pp.409-429.
[74] Graf, Giant, 2001.
[75] Reitlinger, The Final Solution; Hans-Joachim Neufeldt, Jürgen Huck, Georg Tessin, Zur Geschichte des Ordungspolizeis 1936-1945. Koblenz, 1957; Andrej Angrick, Martina Vogt et al, ‘ ‘Da hätte man schon ein Tagebuch führen müssen’. Das Polizeibataillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte während des Sommers und Herbstes 1941’ in Helga Grabitz et al (eds), Die Normalität des Verbrechens. Festschrift für Wolfgang Scheffler. Berlin, 1994; Jürgen Matthäus, ‘What about the ‘Ordinary Men’? The German Order Police and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Union’, HGS 11, 1996, pp.134-150; Klaus-Michel Mallmann, ‘Vom Fussvolk der ‘Endlösung’. Ordnungspolizei, Ostkrieg und Judenmord’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte  XXVI, 1997; Edward B. Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions. Enforcing Racial War in the East. Kansas, 2005; Stefan Klemp, ‘Nicht ermittelt’. Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz – Ein Handbuch. Essen, 2005; Wolfgang Curilla, Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weissrussland 1941-1944. Paderborn, 2006; Erich Haberer, ‘The German police and genocide in Belorussia, 1941-1944: Part I: Police Deployment and Nazi genocidal directives. Part II: The ‘second sweep’: Gendarmerie killings of Jews and Gypsies on January 29, 1942. Part III: methods of genocide and the motives of German police compliance’, Journal of Genocide Research 3/1, pp.13-29, 3/2, pp.207-218, 3/3, pp.391-403.
[76] Graf, Giant, p.40.
[77] This is clearly spelt out in the Jäger report of EK 3, 1.12.41, RGVA 500-1-25, and in the secondary literature, cf. Dieckmann, ‘The War and the Killing of the Lithuanian Jews’, pp.240-75; Petras Stankeras, Litovskie politseiskie batal'ony 1941-1945gg. Moscow: Veche, 2009; also in at least one well-known diary: Kazimierz Sakowicz, Ponary Diary, 1941-1943. A Bystander’s Account of a Mass Murder. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
[78] Margers Vestermanis, ‘Der lettische Anteil an der "Endloesung". Versuch einer Antwort’, in Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, Rainer Zitelmann (eds), Die Schatten der Vergangenheit. Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin: Propylaen, 1990; Andrew Ezergailis, The Holocaust in Latvia 1941-1944. The Missing Centre. Washington, DC, 1996; Katrin Reichelt, Lettland unter deutscher Besatzung 1941-1944. Der lettische Anteil am Holocaust. Berlin: Metropol, 2011; 'Unichtozhit' kak mozhno bol'she..' Latviiskie kollaboratsionistskie formirovaniia na territorii Belorussii, 1942-1944 gg. Sbornik dokumentov. Moscow: Fond 'Istoricheskii pamiat', 2009.
[79] Ruth Bettina Birn, ‘Collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Estonian Security Police’, Contemporary European History, 10/2, July 2001, pp.181-198; Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder Without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009.
[80] Graf, Giant, p.36.
[81] Raul Hilberg, The Destruction Of The European Jews. Third Edition, Vol. 2. Yale Univ. Press 2003, p.299 n.16 and p.303.
[82] George Tessin, Norbert Kannapin, and Bruen Meyer, Waffen-SS und Ordnungspolizei in Kriegseinsatz. Osnabrueck. Biblio Verlag, 2000, pp.629-38.
[83] Yehoshua Robert Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS. Himmler's Personal Murder Brigades in 1941’, HGS I/1, 1986, pp.11-25; Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939-1945. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.
[84] Dieter Pohl, ‘The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine’, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds) The Shoah in Ukraine. Bloomington, 2008, p.40.
[85] As noted above, Himmler’s planning for these units during his visit to Riga was discussed in EM 48, 10.8.41, which notes their availability for use outside their own region. The literature on these units includes Richard Breitman, ‘Himmler’s Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories’, Simon Wiesenthal Center 7, 1997; Franz Golczewski, ‘Organe der deutschen Besatzungsmacht: die ukrainischen Schutzmannschaften’ in Wolfgang Benz, Johannes Houwink ten Cate and Gerhard Otto (eds), Die Bürokratie der Okkupation: Strukturen der Herrschaft und Verwaltung im besetzten Europa. Berlin, 1998; Martin C. Dean, ‘The German Gendarmerie, the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft and the ‘Second Wave’ of Jewish Killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region, 1941-1944’, German History 2/14, 1996; Martin C. Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000; D.A. Zhukov and I.I. Kovtun, Russkaia politsiia, Moscow: Veche, 2010; Leonid Rein, The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia During World War II. Oxford: Berghahn, 2011
[86] Staerkenachweisung der Schutzmannschaft, Orpo Hauptamt, Berlin, 1.7.42, BA R 19/266, pp.5-11.
[87] Christopher R. Browning, Remembering Survival. Inside A Nazi Slave Labor Camp. New York: W.W. Norton, 2010, p.89.

5 comments:

Arthur Crump said...

Could someone tell me what the 'EM' reference means. It has been used in the above source notes numbers 19-21, 29-30 and in others too. I am guessing it has something to do with Einsatzgruppen, but I would just like clarification. Many Thanks.

Arthur Crump said...

Could someone tell me what the reference 'EM' means. It has been used in the source notes above and appears in numbers 19-21 plus others.
I guess it has something to do with Einsatzgruppen but I would just like clarification.
Many Thanks

Arthur Crump said...

Just checking whether you received my earlier query. This 'moderation' procedure is also confusing me - we get a picture of a number and then a printed number that we have to key in to prove we are not 'robots', but what number do I key in? one or the other or both?

Arthur Crump said...

Sorry if you have now received this message 3 times, but i am confused over this moderation procedure when making comments.

My original query was about a reference used in the source notes. The reference is 'EM' and then there's usually a date after it. Can you tell me what it means please?
Many Thanks

Roberto Muehlenkamp said...

"EM" stands for "Ereignismeldung". The reports sent by the Einsatzgruppen killing squads from the occupied Soviet territories were called "Ereignismeldung UdSSR", which means "Event Report USSR".