Conclusion
The
flaws in MGK’s writing on Nazi policy, which we have documented above, can be
divided into four categories: self-contradiction, irrelevancy, highly selective
sourcing, and distortion.
It is self-contradictory that Mattogno
fixes a resettlement decision in September 1941 but then Kues has to admit that
requests from a very high level (Ribbentrop) to resettle Serb Jews were being
declined by Himmler in October. It is self-refuting for Mattogno to admit that
Wetzel was referring to gassing on 25.10.41 but for Kues to claim that
Rademacher was referring to mere resettlement of Serb Jews in a document
written on the very same day.
Irrelevancy and selective sourcing dog
Mattogno’s chapters on ‘emigration’. It amounts to a strategy of distracting
the reader: ‘misdirection’. Mattogno’s assumption that Zeitschel’s request in
August 1941 is more important than the well-documented deportation negotiations
of October 1941 (which were won by Wetzel’s assurances about “Brack’s device”)
is clearly spurious. Kues’ claim that Rademacher’s deportation note of October
25, 1941 refutes Turner’s gas van document of April 11, 1942, is an amazing
chronological misdirection that ignores piles of intervening documentation,
commencing with the Wetzel draft of the same October date, which clearly leads
into the gassing timeline that takes the policy to Chelmno, the Ostland, Serbia
and the Aktion Reinhard camps through gradual radicalization. Selective
sourcing is most egregious, as noted above, in the Ostland paper trail of Kube
and Lohse. The distortion of this documentation is so blatant that it amounts
to a strategy of deliberately hiding smoking guns.
As readers can see, therefore, there
are more than enough examples of distortion in MGK’s work to prove their lack
of scruples. This chapter does not address absolutely every last example that
could be found in the trilogy, as it would lengthen the chapter several fold.
We have, however, covered the most serious cases.
The intended result of Mattogno’s
distortions is to bury the real timeline of extermination, which we have
rehearsed above. There was a process of cumulative radicalization that began
with starvation planning in the spring and culminated in Himmler’s order of
July 1942 to kill working Jews as well as non-working Jews. This process had
two peaks – the July 1941 Hitler’s decision to kill all Soviet Jews (with some
labor exemptions) and the December 1941 decision to kill Jews across Europe
within the timeframe of the war – but these peaks were not a culmination
because they still left open the matter of how quickly each category of Jews
(non-working and working) would be killed. This was not resolved in full until
July 1942, when Himmler set a deadline of December 31, 1942, but even then
Himmler eventually had to concede some labor exemptions, which were
concentrated into SS run camps. The fate of Jews in these camps is discussed in
later chapters.
Finally,
it is anticipated that MGK may mislead readers by pointing out that some
children and old people survived to the end of the war, which they infer as
meaning there was no extermination policy. This would be fallacious because it
would omit the obstacles faced by the SS in the execution of policy. Some
ghettos gave permits to the immediate families of essential workers (as we show
below); some had officials who were bribed into giving out work permits to the
highest bidder[260],
and some had children who were hidden. The SS eventually tracked most of these
down, as we saw in the case of Domachevo above, but, given that Germany was
fighting a losing war militarily, the SS could not ultimately track down every
hidden child and overcome every local Wehrmacht official who wanted to keep productive
Jews. Those that survived, however, were a tiny minority of the total Jewish
population that came under Nazi rule. MGK’s deceptions cannot negate this fact.
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