Sunday, December 25, 2011

Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. Chapter 2: Nazi Policy (3). Evolution of Europe-Wide Final Solution, September - December 1941.

Author: HC Guest Blogger

Evolution of Europe-Wide Final Solution, September - December 1941

The decision-making process to kill Europe’s Jews was a mixture of decisions made at the top by the Führer and Himmler, and decisions made in consultation with more junior personnel concerning local killing actions. The centre allowed local authorities to kill Jews in increasing numbers, and these local killings then fed the centre’s growing desire for killing Jews on a Europe-wide scale. Local killing decisions normalised extermination thinking that had been developing at the centre.

The following discussion contrasts Mattogno’s fantasies about a Nazi resettlement decision with the real historiography of the decision-making process. It shows how, in order to promote his thesis, Mattogno has to suppress evidence whilst distorting the meaning of documents that actually prove extermination.

Mattogno’s distortions begin by softening the reality of the plans that preceded the Final Solution. On page 198 of Sobibór, Mattogno claims that the Madagascar Plan formulated by Franz Rademacher[88] proposed for the Jews an “autonomous state under German supervision.” He then translates one of Rademacher’s lines as, "Within this territory, the Jews will be given autonomy in other respects: their own mayors, their own police, their own postal and railroad services, etc." However, he omits the key sentence preceding that line, which transforms the passage in a way that Mattogno has intentionally concealed:
That part of the island not required for military purposes will be placed under the administration of a German Police Governor, who will be under the administration of the Reichsführer-SS. Apart from this, the Jews will have their own administration in this territory: their own mayors, police, postal and railroad administration, etc.[89]
Rademacher’s wording, omitted by Mattogno, clearly shows that the Madagascar reservation would have been an SS enclosure. Mattogno also omits Rademacher’s insistence that the Jews would be hostages:
Moreover, the Jews will remain in German hands as a pledge for the future good behaviour of the members of their race in America.
Mattogno’s “an autonomous state” is directly contradicted by Rademacher’s insistence that “our German sense of responsibility towards the world forbids us to make the gift of a sovereign state to a race which has had no independent state for thousands of years.” Mattogno also omits Rademacher’s rejection, in a later document[90], of the idea of sending Jews to Palestine, because of the "danger of a second Rome!", even though this phrase was quoted by fellow denier David Irving in Hitler’s War.[91]

When Mattogno discusses the end of the Madagascar Plan, in Treblinka (p.186) he claims it was "temporarily shelved" in September 1941; Sobibór (p. 209) gives February 10, 1942 as the official date when the plan was cancelled.[92] However, this fact undermines Graf’s reliance on Goebbels’ March 7, 1942 diary entry where he references deportations to Madagascar:
Being one of the leading figures of the Third Reich, Dr. Goebbels would of course have known about such an extermination policy, so how do the “holocaust” historians explain the fact that he spoke of the concentration of the Jews in the East and advocated assigning them Madagascar (or another island) as late as on 7 March 1942? [93]
Mattogno and Graf get themselves into this muddle because of their insistence upon clear policy breaks that allow no overlaps, and because they wish to pretend that Madagascar and ‘resettlement to the East’ were both benign plans rather than genocidal ones. Their reliance on a figure tertiary to the decision-making process also doesn’t help them.

Mattogno also ignores the fact that the Madagascar Plan evolved at the same time as written exchanges between Wetzel and Himmler on racial policy. Mattogno cites selectively from this documentation in Sobibór[94], in a lame attempt to neutralize it, but ignores its implications for the decimatory nature of ‘resettlement’. On November 25, 1939, Wetzel and Hecht stated that “We are indifferent to the hygienic fate of the Jews. Also for the Jews the basic principle is valid, that their propagation must be curtailed in every possible way.” This clearly converges with developments in 1940 ignored by Mattogno such as Brack’s proposals for sterilization by X-ray[95] and Hitler’s authorization of forced abortions. In May 1940, Himmler said that:
...I hope that the concept of Jews will be completely extinguished through the possibility of large-scale emigration of all Jews to Africa or some other colony. It must also be possible, in a somewhat longer period of time, to let the national concept of Ukrainians, Gorals and Lemcos disappear in our territory. Whatever is said concerning these splinter peoples applies on a correspondingly larger scale to the Poles....Cruel and tragic as every individual case may be, this method is the mildest and best if, out of inner conviction, we reject the Bolshevist method of physical destruction of a people as un-Germanic and impossible....[96]
Himmler was thus proposing, at the very least, a short-term extermination of Jewishness as a cultural identity through emigration to Madagascar. How else would this have been achieved apart from decimation? Mattogno clings to the latter sentence about how “we reject the Bolshevist method of physical destruction of a people as un-Germanic and impossible” but this assumes that Himmler included Jews in his definition of “a people”, which is clearly very unlikely; both Wetzel and Himmler stressed that Jews were to be treated differently from the other eastern nationalities discussed in these documents. Even in the unlikely event that Himmler was rejecting the physical extermination of Jews in 1940, it would be the snapshot fallacy to cite this to try and neutralise the 1941-44 paper trail. It is possible but unlikely that Himmler rejected the idea of extermination in May 1940, but utterly ludicrous by June-December 1941.

Mattogno’s policy chapter in Treblinka (Chapter VI), duplicated in Sobibór (Chapter 7), relies heavily upon a note sent by Zeitschel, an advisor at the German embassy in Paris, for the attention of ambassador Otto Abetz, suggesting that all the Jews in places occupied by the Germans be deported to “a special territory presumably marked off for them.” Mattogno claims that:
Zeitschel's proposal was thus accepted some months later by Hitler himself, who resolved to temporarily shelve the Madagascar Plan and to deport all Jews living in the occupied territories to the east. This decision of the Führer was probably made in September 1941.[97]
The vagueness of ‘probably’ contradicts Mattogno’s demand for precision in the policy thresholds he imposes on his strawman version of the proper historiography. Moreover, the focus on Zeitschel and Abetz is selective because it ignores three crucial facts. Firstly, on the previous day, Zeitschel had proposed the sterilization of all Jews on German-controlled soil.[98] Zeitschel’s intentions therefore clearly had a genocidal purpose, and reflected sterilization experiments that were already taking place in Berlin.[99] Secondly, as noted above, when Hitler met with Abetz on September 16, 1941, the Führer discussed plans to starve millions of people in Leningrad.[100]

Abetz was therefore fully aware that the fate awaiting the Jews would involve highly attritional death rates, as Hitler had already told him that he would remove “Everything the population needed to survive” from the “Asians and Bolshevists.” Mattogno ignores this context because, by implication, it shows that Hitler would not allow Jews, who were automatically defined as enemies of the Reich, to survive in the USSR. Thirdly, Mattogno ignores the context of revenge and reprisal, which had been heightened by Stalin's decision to deport Volga Germans to Siberia.

Mattogno's narrowing of the decision to deport Reich Jews to just the Zeitschel-Abetz influence enables him to ignore the true pattern of radicalization that took place between September and December, 1941. Rosenberg interpreted the deportation of Volga Germans as an act of mass murder in his diary entry of September 12, 1941.[101] His subordinate Leibbrandt, who headed the Eastern Ministry's Political unit, echoed this the next day by declaring that "Jewry in the areas located in the German field of power. . . will be repaid manyfold for the crime."[102] Leibbrandt had a strong emotional connection to the Volga Germans because his academic career had been largely devoted to studying them. The fact that deportation meant death was recognized by the Volkischer Beobachter when it noted in a headline that Volga Germans deported to Siberia were to be eradicated under the pretext of resettlement. This was reproduced in German-language newspapers elsewhere.[103]

Hitler acceded to Rosenberg's request to deport Reich Jews as a reprisal measure on September 14, according to Braeutigam's contemporary record.[104] Initially, however, Hitler had been hesitant; the representative for the Eastern Ministry in Hitler`s headquarters, Koeppen, wrote that the Envoy von Steengracht (representative of the Foreign Office in the headquarters of the Führer) had told him that Hitler was considering the question of postponing possible "Pressalien" (i.e. Repressalien; reprisals) against the German Jews "for [the] eventuality of an American entry into the war." [105] The intended fate of these Jews, at least according to Heydrich's understanding, was spelled out on October 10 in Prague when Heydrich noted that Hitler wanted "the Jews to be removed from German space if possible by the end of the year" and that "SS Brigadeführer Nebe and Rasch could also take Jews into the camps for Communist prisoners within the area of military operations. [106]

These discussions took place at a time when the content of exterminatory antisemitic propaganada and Hitler's private utterances was becoming more extreme. On October 21 and 25, Hitler connected deportation to extermination when he stated that "By exterminating this pest, we shall do humanity a service of which our soldiers can have no idea" and "That race of criminals has on its conscience the two million dead of the first World War, and now already hundreds of thousands more. Let nobody tell me that all the same we can't park them in the marshy parts of Russia! Who's worrying about our troops? It's not a bad idea, by the way, that public rumour attributes to us a plan to exterminate the Jews. Terror is a salutary thing."[107] On the same day as this statement, Leibbrandt's subordinate Wetzel drafted a letter for Lohse concerning how unfit Jews could be gassed:
Re: Your report of October 4, 1941 in respect to the Solution of the Jewish Question.
Referring to my letter of 18 October 1941, you are informed that Oberdienstleiter Brack of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer has declared himself ready to collaborate in the manufacture of the necessary shelters, as well as the gassing apparatus. At the present time the apparatus in question are not on hand in the Reich in sufficient number; they will first have to be manufactured. Since in Brack's opinion the manufacture of the apparatus in the Reich will cause more difficulty than if manufactured on the spot, Brack deems it most expedient to send his people direct to Riga, especially his chemist Dr. Kallmeyer, who will have everything further done there. Oberdienstleiter Brack points out that the process in question is not without danger, so that special protective measures are necessary. Under these circumstances I beg you to turn to Oberdienstleiter Brack, in the Chancellery of the Fuehrer, through your Higher SS and Police Leader and to request the dispatch of the chemist Dr. Kallmeyer as well as of further aides. I draw attention to the fact that Sturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, the referent for Jewish questions in the RSHA, is in agreement with this process. On information from Sturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, camps for Jews are to be set up in Riga and Minsk to which Jews from the old Reich territory may possibly be sent. At the present time, Jews being deported from the old Reich are to be sent to Litzmannstadt [Lodz], but also to other camps, to be later used as labor (Arbeitseinsatz) the East so far as they are able to work.
As affairs now stand, there are no objections against doing away with those Jews who are unable to work with the Brack remedy. In this way occurrences would no longer be possible such as those which, according to a report presently before me, took place at the shooting of Jews in Vilna [Vilnyus] and which, considering that the shootings were public, were hardly excusable. Those able to work, on the other hand, will be transported to the East for labor service. It is self-understood that among the Jews capable of work, men and women are to be kept separate.

I beg you to advise me regarding your further steps.[108]
The context of this draft should be noted. Wetzel also drafted a covering letter on behalf of Rosenberg, so claims of forgery would need to account for both drafts, not just one.[109] Both drafts had been prepared for Lohse’s attention but must have been given to him verbally because he arrived in Berlin on the same day to protest against the planned deportation of Reich Jews to Riga and Minsk. Furthermore, only two days before this draft, and on the same day that Wetzel was meeting with Brack, Paul Wurm, the foreign editor of Der Stürmer, had written from Berlin to Franz Rademacher advising him that "many of the Jewish vermin will be exterminated through special measures." [110] It is thus certain that Lohse was aware of plans to kill deported Jews in the Ostland before he left Berlin. Consequently, when Leibbrant informed Lohse that Reich Jews would be sent "farther east" than Riga, Lohse understood this was simply a euphemism for this process of selection. [111]

Similarly, Lohse understood the meaning of a note from Heydrich's subordinate Lange advising him that "essential work" on the camps that were supposed to receive Reich Jews in Riga had not yet commenced and that other arrangements could be made if the camps were not ready [112] and Lange's letter of November 8, which revealed that five transports may be sent to Kaunas.[113].

Wetzel's draft coincided with other gassing developments concerning the USSR. Sergey Romanov has published a document cited by Gerlach showing the arrival of two “gas vans” (Gaswagen in the original German) in Smolensk in February 1942.[114] Court proceedings have also uncovered that, around the end of May 1942, EK 8 received a gas van from Smolensk. The driver was SS-Hstuf Sch., who belonged to the driver Staffel of the EK.[115]

Against this raft of evidence for gassing developments related to the USSR, Mattogno cites only Brack’s Nuremberg testimony on CO cylinders, and states that this applied to the same device as in Wetzel’s draft[116], but the exchange he cites was referring only to the gassing of mental patients in T4 euthanasia centres[117] so was irrelevant to the proposed gassing of Jews in Riga.

This same section then engages in a fallacy of excluded middle by assuming that the Riga plan must have been abandoned when work began on Belzec. Moreover, it assumes that Belzec’s original intention must, according to the official historiography, have been to kill fit as well as unfit Jews. This is simply a false reading of the historiography because almost all historians concur that the policy at the time of the Wannsee Protocol was to gas unfit Jews whilst granting workers a stay of execution. Both of these false assumptions can be refuted by noting the obvious fact that the Ostland and Belzec operated as killing sites simultaneously in the spring and summer of 1942, so Belzec was simply an additional killing option at the moment that construction commenced, not a replacement for the Wetzel proposal. Furthermore, by conceding that Wetzel’s document referred to killing, Mattogno concedes a murderous motive, and fails to explain why that motive would not have been carried forward into 1942 at the expense of resettlement.

The period between Wetzel's draft and the Wannsee conference of three months later produced further evidence of escalation. On November 18, three days after a meeting with Himmler, Rosenberg gave a briefing to the German press in which he stated that:
In the east some six million Jew still live, and this question can only be solved in a biological eradication of the entire Jewry of Europe. The Jewish question is only solved for Germany when the last Jew has left German territory, and for Europe when not a single Jew lives on the European continent up to the Urals. ...for this reason it is necessary to expel them over the Urals or eradicate them in some other way.[118]
These ‘six million’ appear again in a draft that Rosenberg prepared for a speech to be given on December 18, in which he threatened “New York Jews” with “a negative elimination of these parasitic elements.” More importantly, on December 14, Rosenberg made a note concerning a meeting with Hitler in which they had decided to modify the speech in the light of the declaration of war against the USA and “the decision” to kill all of Europe’s Jews:
With regard to the Jewish question, I said that my remarks about the New York Jews would perhaps have to be changed now, after the decision. My position was that the extermination of the Jews should not be mentioned. The Führer agreed. He said they had brought the war down on us, they had started all the destruction, so it should come as no surprise if they became its first victims.[119]
Evidence that this was the moment when Hitler announced ‘the decision’ also comes from the speech Goebbels described as having been made to the top echelons of the Nazi party by Hitler on December 12, 1941:
With regard to the Jewish Question, the Führer is determined to make a clean sweep of it. He prophesied that, if they brought about another world war, they would experience their annihilation. That was no empty talk. The world war is here.[120] The annihilation of Jewry must be the necessary consequence. The question is to be viewed without any sentimentality. We’re not there to have sympathy with the Jews, but only sympathy with our own German people. If the German people has again now sacrificed around 160,000 dead in the eastern campaign, the originators of this bloody conflict will have to pay for it with their lives.[121]
The following day, Goebbels wrote that the deportation of French Jews would be "In many cases…equivalent to a death sentence."[122] The number of deaths that Goebbels anticipated must have been high because, the previous day, he had recorded Hitler’s reference to 160,000 dead in the eastern campaign. If the Nazis applied a 100:1 reprisal ratio to Jews for those deaths, then the death toll in reprisals alone would easily encompass every Jew living in Europe. Consequently, although Goebbels referred to the Madagascar Plan as late as March 7, 1942 and was possibly not briefed on Aktion Reinhard until the deportations began later that month (see discussion below in the section on his March 27, 1942 diary entry), he was already, by December 14, 1941, viewing deportation plans through the prism of mass death, in which deportation would result in “the destruction of the Jews”, i.e. the deaths of so many of them that they ceased to be a viable entity, if not their total extermination.

Furthermore, if a reprisal quota of 100:1 were applied to the 160,000 dead Germans in this speech, the quota would justify the killing of all the 11,000,000 Jews that Goebbels mentions on March 7, 1942. It is thus inconceivable that Goebbels would be viewing deportation as a resettlement in which more than a ‘remnant’ of Jews would be left alive. His view of deportation had already been radicalized, even if he was ‘out of the loop’ of discussions on the extent of the extermination and the actual implementation details as to the location, method and timescale of the destruction. Hans Frank reflected the meaning of ‘the decision’ in a speech in Krakow on December 16, 1941:
But what is to happen to the Jews? Do you believe that they will be lodged in settlements in the Ostland? In Berlin we were told: why all this trouble; we cannot use them in the Ostland or the Reichskommissariat either; liquidate them yourselves! Gentlemen, I must ask you, arm yourselves against any thoughts of compassion. We must destroy the Jews, wherever we encounter them and wherever it is possible, in order to preserve the entire structure of the Reich.
Frank continued by noting that "We cannot shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able to take measures, which will lead, somehow, to their annihilation…"[123]

The documents therefore converge on an extermination decision having been finalized in the period when Rosenberg was drafting his speech, as Rosenberg’s note tells us that “the decision” changed the content of the speech, and this occurred in the same week as Hitler’s speech that was noted by Goebbels and echoed by Frank. However, Rosenberg’s previous speech of November 18 had anticipated the decision, whilst leaving open the possibility that Jews may still be killed by expulsion into an inhospitable climate rather than by shooting or gassing. Furthermore, Rosenberg’s awareness of the shooting of Jews ‘as partisans’ on Soviet territory had conditioned his reluctance to agree to Frank’s request to deport Polish Jews to the Ostland in October, whilst his subordinate Wetzel was involved in the quest to find gassing solutions.

Mattogno attempts to evade and deny this evidence by distorting statements made by witnesses to decision-making. On page 235 of Sobibór, Mattogno insists that Führer orders must be located that match those claimed in testimonies by Höß for June 1941 and Wisliceny for April 1942. This is, of course, hypocritical; firstly because Mattogno’s own dating for a resettlement decision is not precise (he says ‘probably’ September, as was noted above) and secondly because he insists in other chapters that perpetrator testimonies are unreliable for purposes of dating and detail. Moreover, Höß’s dating is contradicted by his own affidavit, which stated that he received the order when the three Reinhard camps were already operational.[124] His dating has also been criticized by historians such as Browning[125] and Orth[126] who have shown why it was incorrect. Consequently, there is no reason why historians should follow Höß's dating, and for Mattogno to insist otherwise is simply ludicrous, if not outright dishonest. Historians also point out that perpetrators such as Höß had a motive to insist on an early Führerbefehl, as a way of evading their own personal responsibility for killings, but this obvious point about defence strategy is ignored by Mattogno because it would take away the Führerbefehl strawman.

Mattogno's treatment of Wisliceny's testimony is just as poor. Wisliceny referred to an extermination order by Himmler in April 1942 that gave a temporary exemption to Jews required for essential labour. Mattogno gives no plausible reason why Himmler did not have that authority by that date to issue such an exemption without requiring a superior Hitler order. Moreover, Wisliceny’s claim is supported by documentation that Mattogno ignores. On May 18, 1942, Müller wrote to Jäger, following the execution of 630 workers in Minsk, to inform him that Jews aged 16-32 in these camps were to be "excluded from special measures until further notice."[127] Peter Longerich has concluded using documentation from the GG that Himmler actually gave this order on May 18.Thus the order dated by Wisliceny for April 1942 can actually be documented as having been given in May.[128] Thus the order dated by Wisliceny for April 1942 can actually be documented as having been given in May.

Mattogno’s distortions continue with the evidence regarding the proposed killing of Poles suffering from tuberculosis. [129] On May 1, 1942, Greiser asked Himmler for permission to extend the Sonderbehandlung of "about 100,000 Jews in the area of my ensure that "the cases of open tuberculosis among the Polish people are extirpated." [130] This was followed up by a letter from Koppe to Brandt[131]. Himmler gave his permission on June 27 but requested further consultation[132], which led eventually to a letter by Blome of November 18, 1942, spelling out three options:
Therefore, something basic must be done soon. One must decide the most efficient way in which this can be done. There are three ways to be taken into consideration:
1. Special treatment of the seriously ill persons.
2. Most rigorous isolation of the seriously ill persons.
3. Creation of a reservation for all TB patients.[133] 
Mattogno acknowledges that Greiser was requesting permission to kill these Poles, but then perversely omits the connection with the killing of the 100,000 Jews that Greiser explicitly made in the letter.[134] Blome presented Sonderbehandlung and the "Creation of a reservation for all TB patients" as mutually exclusive options.[135] The same distinction was made by Himmler in his reply, which rejected the proposal on the grounds that the technology to screen the incurable Poles in order to separate them from other patients was not yet ready.[136] Consequently, Sonderbehandlung could not mean resettlement, contrary to the claim made by Mattogno, who states that this was an extension of the Himmler-Greiser correspondence of September 1941.[137]

Mattogno further distorts this documentary sequence by claiming that, because Himmler changed his mind about authorizing these killings, this must cast doubt on killings of Polish mental patients in 1939-40.[138] However, this is a chronological distortion because Blome’s letter had referred to the political controversy leading up to the suspension of the euthanasia program as his reason for fearing that the TB euthanasia would be similarly controversial:
I could imagine that the Führer, having some time ago stopped the program in the insane asylums, might at this moment consider a "special treatment" of the incurably sick as unsuitable and irresponsible from a political point of view.[139]
This also reveals Mattogno's confusion about how much he wishes to concede about Nazi 'euthanasia' actions. He is willing to acknowledge euthanasia when he can claim that it was done without the use of gassing and in a way that may be defensible via a concept of "mercy killing", but he denies evidence that might force a concession that Poles and Jews were ever gassed.

Editorial Note: This section was updated by Jonathan Harrison in May 2018 to incorporate sources we have acquired since 2011, add hyperlinks to sources available online and to correct minor errors in the original, which remains available in the pdf of the First Edition of the White Paper. The fundamental interpretations and criticisms presented in 2011 are mostly unchanged.
[88] Mattogno incorrectly refers to him as ‘Fritz Rademacher’; MGK, Sobibór, p. 198.
[89] Kurzer Überblick über die neu aufzunehmenden, vordringlichen Aufgaben des Ref. D III, 3.6.40, YVA O.51/115, p. 9; Plan zur Lösung der Judenfrage, 2.7.40, NG-2586-B, YVA O.51/115, pp. 10-11, here p.10; Die Judenfrage im Friedensvertrage, 3.7.40, ADAP D,10, pp.92-94 [Dok. 101], translation at
[90] Peter Longerich, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews. Oxford, 2010, p.162, citing Rademacher an Luther, Gedanken ueber die Arbeit und Aufgaben des Ref. D III, PA, Inland II AB 347/3; synopsis Rademacher an Dannecker, 5.8.40, NG-5764.
[91] Kurzer Überblick über die neu aufzunehmenden, vordringlichen Aufgaben des Ref. D III, 3.6.40, YVA O.51/115, p. 9; David Irving, Hitler’s War on-line edition, p.136:
[92] The official cancellation by Franz Rademacher in February 1942 shows the transparency and deceitfulness of Hitler’s reference to the plan several months later.  
[93] Jürgen Graf, ‘Hungarian Holocaust Debate: Otto Perge vs. Dr. Laszlo Karzai’. Online at
[94] MGK, Sobibór, pp.196-97 and pp.236-39.
[95] Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevoelkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten, 25.11.39, NO-3732, cited in Browning, The Path To Genocide, p.146;Brack an Himmler, 28.3.41, NO-203.
[96] Himmler an Hitler, 25.5.40, NO-1880.
[97] M&G, Treblinka, pp.184-86, citing Zeitschel an Abetz, 22.8.41, 1017-PS. Note that this Mattogno paragraph contains a direct contradiction between "some months later" and "September 1941": Zeitschel’s proposal was dated 22.8.41, so a September decision would be one month or less afterwards.
[98] Zeitschel, 21.8.41, CDJC, V-8, published in Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy - Auschwitz. Die Zusammenarbeit der deutschen und französischen Behörden bei der "Endlösung der Judenfrage" in Frankreich. Nördlingen, 1989, p.367.
[99] Brack an Himmler, 28.3.41, NO-203.
[100] Äußerungen des Fuehrers zu Botschafter Abetz, 16.9.41, ADAP, D, 13/2. Goettingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1970, pp.423-25. Translation in Documents on German Foreign Policy, D, XIII, No. 327, pp.518-520, here p.520.
[101] Alfred Rosenberg, Tagebuch, 1936-1944, p.118 (12.9.41, posted online by David Irving in 2014 at
[102] Cited in Eric J. Schmaltz and Samuel D. Sinner, 'The Nazi Ethnographic Research of Georg Leibbrandt and Karl Stumpp in Ukraine, and Its North American Legacy', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 14 (1), March 2000, pp.28–64, here p.42.
[103] "Verschleppung der Wolgadeutschen. Abtransport nach Sibirien — Das Märchen von der „fünften Kolonne”". Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Nr. 98, 10.9.41; Wolfram Meyer zu Uptrup, Kampf gegen die "jüdische Weltverschwörung". Propaganda und Antisemitismus der Nationalsozialisten 1919 bis 1945, Berlin, 2003, p.387, citing Voelkische Beobachter, 11.9.41, p.1 (VB 254).  
[104] Longerich, Holocaust, p.267, citing H. D. Heilmann, ‘Aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Diplomaten Otto Bräutigam’, in Götz Aly et al., eds, Biedermann und Schreibtischtäter. Materialien zur deutschen Täter-Biographie. Institut für Sozialforschung Hamburg. Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik 4 (1987), p.144.
[105] Published in Martin Vogt (ed.), Herbst 1941 im „Führerhauptquartier“. Berichte Werner Koeppens an seinen Minister Alfred Rosenberg. Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 2002, pp.34-35.
[106] Notizen aus der Besprechung am 10.10.41 über die Lösung der Judenfragen, T/294, pp. 2 and 6; English translation in Longerich, Holocaust, p.271.
[107] Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations, translated by Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens, p.79 and p.87.
[108] Wetzel draft an Lohse, 25.10.41, facsimile and English translation at M.9/350, pp.4-7, NO-365.
[109] Wetzel draft an Lohse, 25.10.41, NO-996 and NO-997.
[110] Browning, Origins, p. 369, citing Wurm an Rademacher, 23.10.41, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, Inland II A/B 59/3.
[111] Leibbrandt an Lohse, 9.11.41 and 13.11.41, YVA O.53/132, pp.53-56.
[112] Der Reichskommissar für das Ostland, Vermerk, Riga, den 27. Oktober 1941, YVA O.18/155, initialed by Wetzel; cf Browning, Origins, 2004, p.333.
[113] Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. - Einsatzgruppe A an den Herrn Reichskommissar fuer das Ostland in Riga, Betr.: Judentransporte aus dem Reich in das Ostland, 8.11.41, YVA O.18/158, p.1.
[115] JuNSV, Bd. 23, Nr. 624, p.344 (Urteil LG Frankfurt/Main 4 Ks 1/65 gegen Josef Har., 12.3.66); cf. also JuNSV Bd. XXXIII, Lfd. Nr. 720; JuNSV Bd. XXXII, Lfd Nr. 702.
[116] MGK, Sobibór, pp.274-75.
[118] Christopher R. Browning, Evidence for the Implementation of the Final Solution, citing Rosenberg speech, 18.11.1941, in Political Archives of the Foreign Office, Pol. XIII, VAA Berichte. 
[119] Rosenberg, Vermerk über die Unterredung beim Führer, 14.12.41, O.18/252, 1517-PS, IMT XXVII, p.270ff.
[120] This was the week that Germany declared war on the USA.
[121] TBJG II/2, pp.498-99 (13.12.1941).
[122] TBJG II/2, p.503 (14.12.1941).
[123] Extract from Frank speech, Krakow, 16.12.41, 2233-D-PS, YVA M.9/255, English translation at
[124] Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 5.4.46, 3868-PS, NCA VI, pp. 787-90.
[125] Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony. Madison, WI, 2003.
[126] Karin Orth, ‘Rudolf Höss und die ‘Endlösung der Judenfrage’. Drei Argumente gegen deren Datierung auf den Sommer 1941’, WerkstattGeschichte 18, 1997, pp.45-57. Mattogno misdates this as 1999.
[127] FS Müller an Jäger, Betr.: Endgültige Lösung der Judenfrage, 18.5.1942, RGVA 500-1-25, p.379.
[128] Longerich, Holocaust, p.342, citing minute of chief of staff of SSPF Cracow 27.7.42, BAB, NS 19/1765.
[129] Scans and translations of all the documents discussed in this section can be found in
[130] Greiser an Himmler, 1.5.42, NO-246.
[131] Koppe an Brandt, 3.5.1942, NO-247.
[132] Himmler an Greiser, 27.6.42, NO-244.
[133] Blome an Himmler, 18.11.42, NO-250.
[134] MGK, Sobibór, p.280 n.850.
[135] Blome an Himmler, 18.11.42, NO-250
[136] Himmler an Greiser, 3.12.42, NO-251
[137] Mattogno, Chelmno, p.41.
[138] MGK, Sobibór, p.280 n.850.
[139] Blome an Himmler, 18.11.42, NO-250.

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