Sunday, December 25, 2011

Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. Chapter 2: Nazi Policy (3). Evolution of Europe-Wide Final Solution, September - December 1941.

Author: HC Guest Blogger

Evolution of Europe-Wide Final Solution, September - December 1941

The decision-making process to kill Europe’s Jews was a mixture of decisions made at the top by the Führer and Himmler, and decisions made in consultation with more junior personnel concerning local killing actions. The centre allowed local authorities to kill Jews in increasing numbers, and these local killings then fed the centre’s growing desire for killing Jews on a Europe-wide scale. Local killing decisions normalised extermination thinking that had been developing at the centre.
The following discussion contrasts Mattogno’s fantasies about a Nazi resettlement decision with the real historiography of the decision-making process. It shows how, in order to promote his thesis, Mattogno has to suppress evidence whilst distorting the meaning of documents that actually prove extermination.
Mattogno’s distortions begin by softening the reality of the plans that preceded the Final Solution. On page 198 of Sobibór, Mattogno claims that the Madagascar Plan formulated by Franz Rademacher[88] proposed for the Jews an “autonomous state under German supervision.” He then translates one of Rademacher’s lines as, “Within this territory, the Jews will be given autonomy in other respects: their own mayors, their own police, their own postal and railroad services, etc.” However, he omits the key sentence preceding that line, which transforms the passage in a way that Mattogno has intentionally concealed:
That part of the island not required for military purposes will be placed under the administration of a German Police Governor, who will be under the administration of the Reichsführer-SS. Apart from this, the Jews will have their own administration in this territory: their own mayors, police, postal and railroad administration, etc.[89]
Rademacher’s wording, omitted by Mattogno, clearly shows that the Madagascar reservation would have been an SS enclosure. Mattogno also omits Rademacher’s insistence that the Jews would be hostages:
Moreover, the Jews will remain in German hands as a pledge for the future good behaviour of the members of their race in America.
Mattogno’s “an autonomous state” is directly contradicted by Rademacher’s insistence that “our German sense of responsibility towards the world forbids us to make the gift of a sovereign state to a race which has had no independent state for thousands of years.” Mattogno also omits Rademacher’s rejection, in an earlier document[90], of the idea of sending Jews to Palestine, because of the “danger of a second Rome!”, even though this phrase was quoted by fellow denier David Irving in Hitler’s War.[91]
When Mattogno discusses the end of the Madagascar Plan, in Treblinka (p.186) he claims it was “temporarily shelved” in September 1941; Sobibór (p. 209) gives February 10, 1942 as the official date when the plan was cancelled.[92] However, this fact undermines Graf’s reliance on Goebbels’ March 7, 1942 diary entry where he references deportations to Madagascar:
Being one of the leading figures of the Third Reich, Dr. Goebbels would of course have known about such an extermination policy, so how do the “holocaust” historians explain the fact that he spoke of the concentration of the Jews in the East and advocated assigning them Madagascar (or another island) as late as on 7 March 1942? [93]
Mattogno and Graf get themselves into this muddle because of their insistence upon clear policy breaks that allow no overlaps, and because they wish to pretend that Madagascar and ‘resettlement to the East’ were both benign plans rather than genocidal ones. Their reliance on a figure tertiary to the decision-making process also doesn’t help them.
Mattogno also ignores the fact that the Madagascar Plan evolved at the same time as written exchanges between Wetzel and Himmler on racial policy. Mattogno cites selectively from this documentation in Sobibór[94], in a lame attempt to neutralize it, but ignores its implications for the decimatory nature of ‘resettlement’. On November 25, 1939, Wetzel and Hecht stated that “We are indifferent to the hygienic fate of the Jews. Also for the Jews the basic principle is valid, that their propagation must be curtailed in every possible way.” This clearly converges with developments in 1940 ignored by Mattogno such as Brack’s proposals for sterilization by X-ray[95] and Hitler’s authorization of forced abortions. In May 1940, Himmler said that:
...I hope that the concept of Jews will be completely extinguished through the possibility of large-scale emigration of all Jews to Africa or some other colony. It must also be possible, in a somewhat longer period of time, to let the national concept of Ukrainians, Gorals and Lemcos disappear in our territory. Whatever is said concerning these splinter peoples applies on a correspondingly larger scale to the Poles....Cruel and tragic as every individual case may be, this method is the mildest and best if, out of inner conviction, we reject the Bolshevist method of physical destruction of a people as un-Germanic and impossible....[96]
Himmler was thus proposing, at the very least, a short-term extermination of Jewishness as a cultural identity through emigration to Madagascar. How else would this have been achieved apart from decimation? Mattogno clings to the latter sentence about how “we reject the Bolshevist method of physical destruction of a people as un-Germanic and impossible” but this assumes that Himmler included Jews in his definition of “a people”, which is clearly very unlikely; both Wetzel and Himmler stressed that Jews were to be treated differently from the other eastern nationalities discussed in these documents. Even in the unlikely event that Himmler was rejecting the physical extermination of Jews in 1940, it would be the snapshot fallacy to cite this to try and neutralise the 1941-44 paper trail. It is possible but unlikely that Himmler rejected the idea of extermination in May 1940, but utterly ludicrous by June-December 1941.
Mattogno’s policy chapter in Treblinka (Chapter VI), duplicated in Sobibór (Chapter 7), relies heavily upon a note sent by Zeitschel, an advisor at the German embassy in Paris, for the attention of ambassador Otto Abetz, suggesting that all the Jews in places occupied by the Germans be deported to “a special territory presumably marked off for them.” Mattogno claims that:
Zeitschel's proposal was thus accepted some months later by Hitler himself, who resolved to temporarily shelve the Madagascar Plan and to deport all Jews living in the occupied territories to the east. This decision of the Führer was probably made in September 1941.[97]
The vagueness of ‘probably’ contradicts Mattogno’s demand for precision in the policy thresholds he imposes on his strawman version of the proper historiography. Moreover, the focus on Zeitschel and Abetz is selective because it ignores three crucial facts. Firstly, on the previous day, Zeitschel had proposed the sterilization of all Jews on German-controlled soil.[98] Zeitschel’s intentions therefore clearly had a genocidal purpose, and reflected sterilization experiments that were already taking place in Berlin.[99] Secondly, when Hitler met with Abetz on September 16, 1941, the Führer discussed plans to starve millions of people in Leningrad:
The Petersburg 'nest of poison' from which for so long Asian poison had flowed into the Baltic, must vanish from the earth. The city [Leningrad] was already surrounded: all that remained to do was to pound it with artillery and from the air. Everything the population needed to survive, such as the water pipes and the power stations, would be destroyed. The Asians and Bolshevists must be chased out of Europe, the episode of '250 years of Asianness' was at an end.[100]
Abetz was therefore fully aware that the fate awaiting the Jews would involve highly attritional death rates, as Hitler had already told him that he would remove “Everything the population needed to survive” from the “Asians and Bolshevists.” Mattogno ignores this context because, by implication, it shows that Hitler would not allow Jews, who were automatically defined as enemies of the Reich, to survive in the USSR. Thirdly, Mattogno ignores the literature that shows how deportation policy in France evolved from reprisals policy. On December 14, 1941, Goebbels described impending deportations from France “to the eastern region” as “In many cases…equivalent to a death sentence.” In April 1942, a Hitler decree stipulated that “for each future assassination…500 Communists and Jews are to be turned over to the RFSS and the German Chief of Police for deportation to the East.”[101] By May 31, 1942, 6,000 Communists and Jews had been deported as “reprisals.”[102] Deportations from France should therefore be understood as having been commenced in lieu of shooting: as an equivalent death sentence. This alone is sufficient to place Zeitschel and Abetz’s correspondence in the timeline of extermination, not (as Mattogno’s title chapter claims) ‘emigration’.  
Mattogno cites Goebbels’ diary entry for August 20, 1941, but overlooks the parts of that entry, cited by Browning, which quote Hitler’s statements that Jews deported to the USSR “will be worked over in the harsh climate there” and:
As for the Jewish question, today in any case one could say that a man like Antonescu, for example, proceeds much more radically in this manner than we have done until now. But I will not rest or be idle until we too have gone all the way with the Jews.[103] 
Hitler would have known that Antonescu’s Rumanian police had been liquidating Jews since July, in co-operation with Einsatzgruppe D, and driving those unfit to work into Transnistria, where most would starve or be shot. For example, Einsatzkommando 11A reported that “551 Jews have been liquidated in Kishinev.”[104]
Mattogno also discusses Goebbels’ meeting with Heydrich on September 24, 1941, in which the latter stated that Jews deported from Berlin “in the end are all supposed to be transported [...] into the camps built by the Bolsheviks[105]; and they cite Hitler’s statement of October 6, 1941, reported by Koeppen, that “Together with the Jews of the Protectorate, all the Jews of Vienna and Berlin must disappear.”[106] However, they fail to make the obvious connection between these two statements: Heydrich’s “camps built by the Bolsheviks” had become places where the Jews of Berlin would “disappear.” How does disappearance in camps equate to a policy of resettlement?
Furthermore, Mattogno cites Heydrich’s Prague meeting of October 10, 1941, but ignores a key passage referring to how Jews would be “decimated” (dezimiert).[107] Eight days earlier, a Heydrich speech in Prague had referred to the need “to gather the plans and the raw material” and to “test the material.”[108] This indicates that the forthcoming deportations were associated with experiments taking place with “raw material.”
In pages 274-276 of Sobibór, Mattogno attempts to neutralize Wetzel’s draft to Lohse of October 25, 1941 (three weeks after Heydrich’s “raw material” speech), concerning the proposed construction of “Vergasungsapparate” (also referred to as “Brack’s device”) in Riga to kill Reich Jews incapable of work.[109] The context of this draft should be noted. Wetzel also drafted a covering letter on behalf of Rosenberg, so claims of forgery would need to account for both drafts, not just one.[110] Both drafts had been prepared for Lohse’s attention but must have been given to him verbally because he arrived in Berlin on the same day to protest against the planned deportation of Reich Jews to Riga and Minsk. Furthermore, only two days before this draft, and on the same day that Wetzel was meeting with Brack, Paul Wurm, the foreign editor of Der Stürmer, had written from Berlin to Franz Rademacher advising him that “many of the Jewish vermin will be exterminated through special measures.” It is thus certain that Lohse was aware of plans to kill deported Jews in the Ostland before he left Berlin.[111] 
Mattogno attempts to negate this entire process by claiming that “Brack’s device” proposed by Wetzel to be used in Riga would have been “carbon monoxide cylinders”, but this is highly doubtful given that, as we show in the Gas Chamber chapter, Widmann had already discussed “the impossibility to transport the CO-cylinders in Russia"[112] (and gassing tests in Mogilev using engine exhaust had already taken place) when Wetzel wrote his draft on October 25. The eventual use of gas vans in the Minsk-Mogilev area was confirmed by EK 8 driver Josef Wendl in court testimony in 1970[113], while Sergey Romanov of Holocaust Controversies has published a document cited by Gerlach showing the arrival of two “gas vans” (Gaswagen in the original German) in Smolensk in February 1942.[114] Court proceedings have also uncovered that, around the end of May 1942, EK 8 received a gas van from Smolensk. The driver was SS-Hstuf Sch., who belonged to the driver Staffel of the EK.[115] Against this raft of evidence, Mattogno cites only Brack’s Nuremberg testimony on CO cylinders, and states that this applied to the same device as in Wetzel’s draft[116], but the exchange he cites was referring only to the gassing of mental patients in T4 euthanasia centres[117] so was irrelevant to the proposed gassing of Jews in Riga.
This same section then engages in a fallacy of excluded middle by assuming that the Riga plan must have been abandoned when work began on Belzec. Moreover, it assumes that Belzec’s original intention must, according to the official historiography, have been to kill fit as well as unfit Jews. This is simply a false reading of the historiography because almost all historians concur that the policy at the time of the Wannsee Protocol was to gas unfit Jews whilst granting workers a stay of execution. Both of these false assumptions can be refuted by noting the obvious fact that the Ostland and Belzec operated as killing sites simultaneously in the spring and summer of 1942, so Belzec was simply an additional killing option at the moment that construction commenced, not a replacement for the Wetzel proposal. Furthermore, by conceding that Wetzel’s document referred to killing, Mattogno concedes a murderous motive, and fails to explain why that motive would not have been carried forward into 1942 at the expense of resettlement.
Mattogno also perpetrates distortions concerning witnesses to decision-making. On page 235 of Sobibór, Mattogno insists that Führer orders must be located that match those claimed in testimonies by Höß for June 1941 and Wisliceny for April 1942. This is, of course, hypocritical; firstly because Mattogno’s own dating for a resettlement decision is not precise (he says ‘probably’ September, as was noted above) and secondly because he insists in other chapters that perpetrator testimonies are unreliable for purposes of dating and detail. Moreover, Höß’s dating is contradicted by his own affidavit, which stated that he received the order when the three Reinhard camps were already operational.[118] His dating has also been criticized by historians such as Browning[119] and Orth[120], who have shown why it was incorrect. Consequently, there is no reason why historians should follow Höß's dating, and for Mattogno to insist otherwise is simply ludicrous, if not outright dishonest. Historians also point out that perpetrators such as Höß had a motive to insist on an early Führerbefehl, as a way of evading their own personal responsibility for killings, but this obvious point about defence strategy is ignored by Mattogno because it would take away the Führerbefehl strawman.
Mattogno's treatment of Wisliceny's testimony is just as poor. Wisliceny referred to an extermination order by Himmler in April 1942 that gave a temporary exemption to Jews required for essential labour. Mattogno gives no plausible reason why Himmler did not have that authority by that date to issue such an exemption without requiring a superior Hitler order. Moreover, Wisliceny’s claim is supported by documentation that Mattogno ignores. On May 18, 1942, Müller wrote to Jäger, following the execution of 630 workers in Minsk, to inform him that Jews aged 16-32 in these camps were to be “excluded from special measures until further notice.”[121] Peter Longerich has concluded using documentation from the GG that Himmler actually gave this order on May 18.[122] Thus the order dated by Wisliceny for April 1942 can actually be documented as having been given in May.
Mattogno claims instead that the original Führerbefehl had, according to Höß, allowed no exceptions, so any exceptions had to be granted by Hitler in a subsequent order, but this does not take cognizance of the fact that Höß’s actual wording simply stated that all Jews were to be “destroyed now during the war, without exception.” By failing to consider the timescale implied by  Höß’s “during the war”, Mattogno falsifies its meaning into one that requires total immediate killing at the time of deportation, whereas in fact Höß's formulation is perfectly compatible with the Wannsee Protocol’s requirement that some Jews were to be exempted for labour but then killed afterwards. There is simply nothing in Höß or other sources that precludes temporary exemptions for labour.
Mattogno’s distortions continue with the 1942 evidence. On May 1, 1942, Greiser asked Himmler for permission to extend the Sonderbehandlung of “about 100,000 Jews in the area of my Gau”[123] to ensure that “the cases of open tuberculosis among the Polish people are extirpated.”[124] Mattogno acknowledges that Greiser was requesting permission to kill these Poles[125], but then perversely omits the connection with the killing of the 100,000 Jews that Greiser explicitly made in the letter. The use of the word Sonderbehandlung to refer to the killing of these Poles also occurs in letters by Koppe[126] and Blome.[127] In the latter, Blome presented Sonderbehandlung and the “Creation of a reservation for all TB patients” as mutually exclusive options, so Sonderbehandlung could not mean resettlement, contrary to the claim made by Mattogno, who states that this was an extension of the Himmler-Greiser correspondence of September 1941.[128] The same distinction was made by Himmler in his reply.[129]
Mattogno further distorts this documentary sequence by claiming that, because Himmler changed his mind about authorizing these killings, this must cast doubt on killings of Polish mental patients in 1939-40. However, this is a chronological distortion because Blome’s letter had referred to the political controversy leading up to the suspension of the euthanasia program as his reason for fearing that the TB euthanasia would be similarly controversial:
I could imagine that the Führer, having some time ago stopped the program in the insane asylums, might at this moment consider a "special treatment" of the incurably sick as unsuitable and irresponsible from a political point of view.
This controversy occurred after the mentally ill Poles had already been killed in 1939-40, so it cannot have prevented the killing of those Poles. Furthermore, Mattogno’s assumption that no tubercular Poles were killed is incorrect; two thousand were recorded as Sonderbehandelt in June 1942.[130]
This long list of distortions by Mattogno is intended to deflect their readers’ attention from the real policy timeline. This can be reconstructed as follows. On September 20, 1941, the representative for the Eastern Ministry in Hitler`s headquarters, Koeppen, wrote that the Envoy von Steengracht (representative of the Foreign Office in the headquarters of the Führer) had told him that Hitler was considering the question of postponing possible "Pressalien" (i.e. Repressalien; reprisals) against the German Jews "for [the] eventuality of an American entry into the war."[131] Given that the reprisal policy that operated in the East and in Serbia was to execute 100 civilians for every killed German soldier, it would be perverse to assume that a Jewish population deported as a reprisal action would not suffer a large death toll, even if the method of death had not yet been decided.
During that early autumn period, the intentions of Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich appear to have been ‘decimation’ rather than a policy to exterminate every Jew. Hitler stated in August that the deported Jews “will be worked over in the harsh climate there.”[132] Hitler did not say “by the harsh climate”, so his formulation left open the possibility that ‘worked over’ could mean active killing by SS and police as well as decimation from hunger and disease. This interpretation is supported by his reference, in the same entry, to Antonescu’s shooting of Rumanian Jews. As we have already seen above, that possibility was also embraced by Heydrich in his Prague meeting of October 10, 1941.
The decision-making process leading to that point can be charted through Rosenberg’s knowledge of Hitler’s intentions as reflected in his documents and speeches in the latter half of 1941 He was present at the meeting of July 16, when Hitler proposed “shooting anyone who even looks sideways at us” in the USSR.[133] Rosenberg declined Frank’s request of October 13 to deport Jews from the General Government into the Ostland, where Soviet Jews were being shot in large numbers. The Wetzel-Lohse draft of October 25 concerning the construction of “Vergasungsapparate” in Riga was prepared for Rosenberg’s attention. On November 18, three days after a meeting with Himmler, Rosenberg gave a briefing to the German press in which he stated that:
In the east some six million Jew still live, and this question can only be solved in a biological eradication of the entire Jewry of Europe. The Jewish question is only solved for Germany when the last Jew has left German territory, and for Europe when not a single Jew lives on the European continent up to the Urals. ...for this reason it is necessary to expel them over the Urals or eradicate them in some other way.[134]
These ‘six million’ appear again in a draft that Rosenberg prepared for a speech to be given on December 18, in which he threatened “New York Jews” with “a negative elimination of these parasitic elements.” More importantly, on December 16, Rosenberg made a note concerning a meeting with Hitler in which they had decided to modify the speech in the light of the declaration of war against the USA and “the decision” to kill all of Europe’s Jews:
With regard to the Jewish question, I said that my remarks about the New York Jews would perhaps have to be changed now, after the decision. My position was that the extermination of the Jews should not be mentioned. The Führer agreed. He said they had brought the war down on us, they had started all the destruction, so it should come as no surprise if they became its first victims.[135]
Evidence that this was the moment when Hitler announced ‘the decision’ also comes from the speech Goebbels described as having been made to the top echelons of the Nazi party by Hitler on December 12, 1941:
With regard to the Jewish Question, the Führer is determined to make a clean sweep of it. He prophesied that, if they brought about another world war, they would experience their annihilation. That was no empty talk. The world war is here[136]. The annihilation of Jewry must be the necessary consequence. The question is to be viewed without any sentimentality. We’re not there to have sympathy with the Jews, but only sympathy with our own German people. If the German people has again now sacrificed around 160,000 dead in the eastern campaign, the originators of this bloody conflict will have to pay for it with their lives.[137]
The following day, Goebbels wrote that the deportation of French Jews would be “In many cases…equivalent to a death sentence.”[138] The number of deaths that Goebbels anticipated must have been high because, the previous day, he had recorded Hitler’s reference to 160,000 dead in the eastern campaign. If the Nazis applied a 100:1 reprisal ratio to Jews for those deaths, then the death toll in reprisals alone would easily encompass every Jew living in Europe. Consequently, although Goebbels referred to the Madagascar Plan as late as March 7, 1942 and was possibly not briefed on Aktion Reinhard until the deportations began later that month (see discussion below in the section on his March 27, 1942 diary entry), he was already, by December 14, 1941, viewing deportation plans through the prism of mass death, in which deportation would result in “the destruction of the Jews”, i.e. the deaths of so many of them that they ceased to be a viable entity, if not their total extermination.
Furthermore, if a reprisal quota of 100:1 were applied to the 160,000 dead Germans in this speech, the quota would justify the killing of all the 11,000,000 Jews that Goebbels mentions on March 7, 1942. It is thus inconceivable that Goebbels would be viewing deportation as a resettlement in which more than a ‘remnant’ of Jews would be left alive. His view of deportation had already been radicalized, even if he was ‘out of the loop’ of discussions on the extent of the extermination and the actual implementation details as to the location, method and timescale of the destruction. Hans Frank reflected the meaning of ‘the decision’ in a speech in Krakow on December 16, 1941:
But what is to happen to the Jews? Do you believe that they will be lodged in settlements in the Ostland? In Berlin we were told: why all this trouble; we cannot use them in the Ostland or the Reichskommissariat either; liquidate them yourselves! Gentlemen, I must ask you, arm yourselves against any thoughts of compassion. We must destroy the Jews, wherever we encounter them and wherever it is possible, in order to preserve the entire structure of the Reich.
Frank continued by noting that “We cannot shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able to take measures, which will lead, somehow, to their annihilation…”[139] The documents therefore converge on an extermination decision having been finalized in the period when Rosenberg was drafting his speech, as Rosenberg’s note tells us that “the decision” changed the content of the speech, and this occurred in the same week as Hitler’s speech that was noted by Goebbels and echoed by Frank. However, Rosenberg’s previous speech of November 18 had anticipated the decision, whilst leaving open the possibility that Jews may still be killed by expulsion into an inhospitable climate rather than by shooting or gassing. Furthermore, Rosenberg’s awareness of the shooting of Jews ‘as partisans’ on Soviet territory had conditioned his reluctance to agree to Frank’s request to deport Polish Jews to the Ostland in October, whilst his subordinate Wetzel was involved in the quest to find gassing solutions.

[88] Mattogno incorrectly refers to him as ‘Fritz Rademacher’; MGK, Sobibór, p198.
[89] Rademacher, The Jewish Question in the Peace Treaty, Berlin, 3.7.40, NG-2586-B. Online at
[90] Peter Longerich, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews. Oxford, 2010, p.162, citing Rademacher an Luther, Gedanken ueber die Arbeit und Aufgaben des Ref. D III, PA, Inland II AB 347/3; synopsis Rademacher an Dannecker, 5.8.40, NG-5764.
[91] David Irving, Hitler’s War on-line edition, p.136: .
[92] The official cancellation by Franz Rademacher in February 1942 shows the transparency and deceitfulness of Hitler’s reference to the plan several months later.  
[93] Jürgen Graf, ‘Hungarian Holocaust Debate: Otto Perge vs. Dr. Laszlo Karzai’. Online at
[94] MGK, Sobibór, pp.196-97 and pp.236-39.
[95] Brack an Himmler, 28.3.41, NO-203.
[96] Himmler an Hitler, 25.5.40, NO-1880.
[97] M&G, Treblinka, pp.184-86, citing Zeitschel an Abetz, 22.8.41, 1017-PS. Note that this Mattogno paragraph contains a direct contradiction between “some months later” and “September 1941”: Zeitschel’s proposal was dated 22.8.41, so a September decision would be one month or less afterwards.
[98] Zeitschel, 21.8.41, CDJC, V-8, published in Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy - Auschwitz. Die Zusammenarbeit der deutschen und französischen Behörden bei der "Endlösung der Judenfrage" in Frankreich. Nördlingen, 1989, p.367.
[99] Brack an Himmler, 28.3.41, NO-203.
[100] Note on the Führer's comments to Abetz, 16.9.41, ADAP [Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik], Serie D, Bd. 13/2. Goettingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1970, pp.424-25.
[101] Erlass des Militärbefehlshaber im Frankreich, 10.4.42, RF-1241; for context, see Ulrich Herbert, ‘The German Military Command in Paris and the Deportation of the French Jews’, in Ulrich Herbert (ed), National Socialist Extermination Policies. Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies. London, 2000, pp.128-62; Christopher Neumaier, ‘The Escalation of German Reprisal Policy in Occupied France, 1941-42’, Journal of Contemporary History, 41/1, January 2006, pp.113-31.
[102] Herbert, ‘The German Military Command in Paris’, p.144, citing Das Geiselverfahren im Bereich des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich vom Aug. 1941–Mai 1942, p.40ff. BA RW 35/524.
[103] TBJG, II/1, p.266 (19.8.41) and p.278 (20.8.41).
[104] EM 45, 7.8.41.
[105] TBJG, II/I, pp.480-81 (24.9.1941).
[106] M&G, Treblinka, pp.185-86; Broszat, ‘Hitler und die Genesis der “Endlosung’, pp.739-75: TBJG II/I, pp.480-81 (24.9.41);; Miroslav Karny, Jaroslava Milotova and Margita Karna (eds), Politik im 'Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren' unter Reinhard Heydrich 1941-1942. Berlin, 1997, p.97, citing Notiz Koeppens, 6.10.41.
[107]Minutes of a discussion in Prague on the Solution of the Jewish Question presided over by Heydrich, Prague, 10.10.41, T/294.
[108] Karny, Politik im 'Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren' unter Reinhard Heydrich 1941-1942, pp.107-22.
[109] Wetzel draft an Lohse, 25.10.41, NO-365.
[110] Wetzel draft an Lohse, 25.10.41, NO-996 and NO-997.
[111] Browning, Origins, p. 369, citing Wurm an Rademacher, 23.10.41, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, Inland II A/B 59/3.
[112] Deposition by A.Widmann, Head of Abt. V D 2 (Chemistry and Biology) in the KTI, 11.1.1960; StA Duesseldorf, Az. 8 Js7212/59 [ZSL, Az.202 AR-Z 152/59], Bl.46.
[113] Patricia Heberer, 'Justice in Austrian Courts?' in Patricia Heberer and Jürgen Matthaeus (eds), Atrocities on Trial: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008, p.237, citing testimony of Josef W., Strafsache gegen Josef W., Bd. IX, ON 117, p.16; see also on the gassing of mental patients in Mogilev, Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord. Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941-1943. Hamburg, 2003, p.368ff.
[114] EGr B, Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht, 16-28.2.42, p.7, RGVA 500-1-770; cf. Christian Gerlach, ‘Failure of Plans for an SS Extermination Camp im Mogilew’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 11, 1997, p.77 n.83; Sergey Romanov, ‘How the convergence of evidence works: the gas van of Auschwitz’, Holocaust Controversies, 6.10.06. Scan of document, p.7:. .
[115] JuNSV, Bd. 23, Nr. 624, p.344 (Urteil LG Frankfurt/Main 4 Ks 1/65 gegen Josef Har., 12.3.66); cf. also JuNSV Bd. XXXIII, Lfd. Nr. 720; JuNSV Bd. XXXII, Lfd Nr. 702.
[116] MGK, Sobibór, pp.274-75.
[118] Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 5.4.46, 3868-PS, NCA VI, pp. 787-90.
[119] Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony. Madison, WI, 2003.
[120] Karin Orth, ‘Rudolf Höss und die ‘Endlösung der Judenfrage’. Drei Argumente gegen deren Datierung auf den Sommer 1941’, WerkstattGeschichte 18, 1997, pp.45-57. Mattogno misdates this as 1999.
[121] FS Müller an Jäger, Betr.: Endgültige Lösung der Judenfrage, 18.5.1942, RGVA 500-1-25, p.379.
[122] Longerich, Holocaust, p.342, citing minute of chief of staff of SSPF Cracow 27.7.42, BAB, NS 19/1765.
[123] Greiser an Himmler, 1.5.1942, BA NS19/1585, p.1-R, also NO-246.
[124] Scans and translations of all the documents discussed in this section can be found on-line: Sergey Romanov, ‘Documents about the murderous purpose of SK Lange’, Holocaust Controversies, 9.7.06: .
[125] MGK, Sobibór, p.280 n.850.
[126] Koppe an Brandt, 3.5.1942, BA NS19/1585, p.4, also NO-247.
[127] Blome an Himmler, 18.11.42, NO-250.
[128] Mattogno, Chelmno, p.41.
[129] Himmler an Greiser, 3.12.42, NO-251.
[130] Greiser an Brandt, 27.6.42. NO-252.
[131] Peter Longerich, Hitler's Role in the Persecution of the Jews by the Nazi Regime, electronic version, defence document in Irving v. Lipstadt, 2000, citing BA R 6/34a, Koeppen-Aufzeichnungen, 21.9.1941.
[132] TBJG II/1, pp.266, 278 (19.8.1941, 20.8.1941).
[133] Vermerk über die Besprechung am 16.7.1941, L-221, IMT XXXVIII, p.88.
[134] Christopher R. Browning, Evidence for the Implementation of the Final Solution, citing Rosenberg speech, 18.11.1941, in Political Archives of the Foreign Office, Pol. XIII, VAA Berichte.
[135] Rosenberg, Vermerk über die Unterredung beim Führer, 14.12.41, 1517-PS, IMT XXVII, p.270ff.
[136] This was the week Germany declared war on the United States.
[137] TBJG II/2, pp.498-99 (13.12.1941).
[138] TBJG II/2, p.503 (14.12.1941).
[139] Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (eds), Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945. Stuttgart, 1975, p.457ff.

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