Mattogno and the Activity & Situation Report of Einsatzgruppe B on its Gas Vans

The operation and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B of 1 March 1942 explicitly mentions four "Gaswagen" (gas vans) in the group's motor pool. The report, which was published in the 90s, corroborates earlier evidence such as the testimony of the gas vans' drivers, and vice versa. This independent, mutual corroboration results in more powerful evidence on the reality of Germans homicidal gas vans.

As a starter and to provide some context, the activities of the group, which demanded the use of gas vans, and the contribution of the group to the development of gas vans will be outlined. The central part looks at what the Einsatzgruppe B report stated on its gas vans and relates this to other sources. The final section addresses why the "Revisionist" Carlo Mattogno failed once again with his denial of German homicidal gas vans.

The Historical Context of the Document

Einsatzgruppe B

On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and the Einsatzgruppen advanced into the Soviet territory in the slipstream of the Army Groups. The tasks of the Einsatzgruppen were summed up in Heydrich's briefing of the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the East of 2 July 1941 as manhunt, intelligence and executions (Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion II, p. 44 f.) The killings comprised the targets communist politicians, functionaries of the communist party and state, Jews in party and state position. This was a well defined and limited group of people, which can be expected to have been mostly evacuated upon the Soviet retreat anyway. Indeed, the number of killed people among these groups are almost negligible within the overall death toll of the Einsatzgruppen.

But Heydrich added another category of targets, which were to become the primary victims: "other radical elements". Ill-defined and vague as it was formulated and open for interpretation, it gave the Einsatzgruppen the license to physically exterminate anything considered necessary and useful for the Nazi agenda. It meant not only the killing of insurgents, political dissidents, opposition and criminals without any trial whatsoever but also the liquidation of beggars, gypsies, so-called racially inferior people, mentally ill and - most of all - the Jews.

The Einsatzgruppe B followed the Army Group Centre into Soviet territory. Its Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos advanced via Brest, Wilna, Bialystok and Minsk deep into White Ruthenia and reached the Russian city Smolensk. The first killings were carried out in Wilna among "Jewish communist party functionaries" (activity report USSR no. 11 of 3 July 1941, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I, p. 70), but the shootings were quickly extended to Jewish "intelligentsia", "political activists" and "wealthy Jews" (activity report USSR no.17 of 9 July 1941, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I, p. 98). 321 Jews were killed between 3rd and 8th July 1941 in Wilna. Yet, this was only a first sign and warning shot of what was to come about for the Eastern European Jews. The Einsatzkommando 9 ordered 150 local policemen "to take part in the liquidation of the Jews" and "about 500 Jews and other saboteurs are liquidated every day". The group further reported that "1050 Jews were liquidated" and "more are continuously brought to execution every day" in the detention camp for civilians in Minsk (activity report USSR no. 21 of 13 July 1941, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I, 113 f.).

The first 100% quota of killed Jews was officially reported on 23 September 1941 for Lahoysk. The Einsatzkommando 9 and members of the SS division Das Reich "executed" 920 Jews and the report concluded that the "place can be now called free of Jews" (activity report USSR no. 92 of 23 September 1941, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I, p. 546). The chief of Einsatzgruppe B Arthur Nebe only won the third place of this challenge though, as Einsatzgruppe A and D reported the extermination of all Jews in whole areas already in the earlier activity reports of 19 and 20 September 1941 (activity reports USSR no. 88 & 89, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I, p. 494 & 511; however, according to Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 2012, p. 569 f. relying mostly on testimonial evidence, entire Jewish communities were liquidated already since late August 1941 by units of Einsatzgruppe B). Other places shot free or nearly free of Jews by units of Einsatzgruppe B according to the various activity reports USSR were Krupka (912 victims), Sholopenitsche (812), Mogilev (about 5000), Bobruisk (7079), Smalyavichy (1401), Vitebsk twice (about 3000 in October 1941 and 4090 in December 1941), Nevel (714), Janovichi (1025).

In total, Einsatzgruppe B reported the killing of about 71,600 people between July and December 1941. Another 62,600 victims were added to the death toll until mid-December 1942. The accumulated body count of Einsatzgruppe B over time is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Accumulated killings reported by Einsatzgruppe B between 24 June 1941 - 31 March 1943. Figures from activity report no. 31 & 73 & 108 & 125 & 133 of 23 July & 4 September & 9 & 26 October & 14 November 1941 (reproduced in Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I), operation and situation report of 1 March and 1 September 1942 (Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen II, p. 296 & 404), operation and situation report for 15 November to 15 December 1942 (BArch B162/21579, p. 94), operation and situation report for 1 to 31 March 1943 (Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen II, p. 574). The figure of 22 December 1941 was calculated from the sum of the summary total of 14 November 1941, and the individual killing actions further reported up to 22 December 1941.

For 1941, the activity reports provide the killing reason for 59,877 victims of Einsatzgruppe B. The breakdown is depicted in Figure 2. The category "others" covers the execution of communist functionaries, NKVD agents & informers, supporters of partisans, saboteurs and criminals. Together with the category "partisans", it accounts for 5% of the victims of Einsatzgruppe B. It's precisely this group of people the Einsatzgruppen should have been limited to if they had no genocidal and democidal task. Yet, these made up only a fraction of their executions. The vast majority of victims (95%) were Jews, mentally ill people and so-called "racially inferior elements" ("rassisch vollkommen minderwertige Elemente") from army detention camps for civilians.

Figure 2: Breakdown of the victims of 59,877 killings mentioned by Einsatzgruppe B in 1941.

The Problem of Mass Shootings

The mass killing by individual shootings of men, women and children, even though numerically quite effective, posed a considerable strain on the shooting squads.

The adjutant of Einsatzgruppe B Karl Schulz testified that "the nerves of the members of the shooting squads were subjected to tremendous strain" (interrogation of Schulz of 9 March 1959, BArch B 162/5066, p. 114). Erwin Cz. of the police reserve battalion 9, whose companies were assigned to the Einsatzgruppen up to December 1941, recalled that "my comrades and I - and I can easily say all comrades - were physically and mentally totally done after such action" (interrogation of 23 January 1962, BArch B 162/3275, p. 196).

According to Albert Hartl, head of the RSHA office IV B on ideological enemies and "visitor" of Einsatzgruppe C, the group's leader Max Thomas explained that people assigned to the shooting squads developed "the worst sadistic drives" or suffered from "hysterical crying" and "health breakdown" (interrogation of Hartl of 16 January 1957, BArch B 162/1254, p. 986). Georg Bi. of the police reserve battalion 9 remembered a case when some "Sergeant Gan. got a nervous break down during the [two days lasting] execution" (interrogation of 25 July 1965, BArch B 162/5654, p. 3547). As the police battalion was withdrawn from Russia in December 1941, its new commander Arthur Se. noticed that "these people had experienced rough times" and that they "had to disable one man and sent them to an asylum after he made use of his duty pistol without any reason" (interrogation of Seidel of 12 December 1963, BArch, B 162/964, p. 1320).

Figure 3.

Von dem Bach-Zelewski himself suffered under a "nervous state of exhaustion" related to the "shooting of Jews supervised by himself and other heavy experiences in the East" according to a contemporary document from the Reichsarzt SS Ernst-Robert Grawitz (letter Grawitz to Himmler of 4 March 1942, Figure 3, from Bartoszewski, Erich von dem Bach, p. 97).

Minsk, 15 August 1941

On 15 August 1941, the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had the following appointment in the morning according to his diary:

"Attending an execution of partisans and Jews near Minsk"  

(Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, p. 195)

The people to be shot were summoned to the execution site by members of the first platoon of the 2nd company of the police reserve battalion 9, which also carried out the execution together with SS/SD members of Einsatzkomando 8. The platoon leader Paul Di. described the shooting as follows:

"120 - 150 prisoners from the Minsk prison were brought in the morning by our men...mostly Jews....When Himmler arrived, the first group of about 15 men was already in the pit. The delinquents laid down in the pit with their face down. I had allocated the execution squad so that each two men were shooting on a delinquent. When Himmler came with his entourage, Dr. Bradfisch reported to him and the shooting was immediately started. Two pits had been prepared. At one pit the Jews were shot by my platoon, at the other pit the Security Service was shooting. The pits were at 30 m distance. Himmler and his entourage stayed in between to closely observe the shooting. When I gave the firing command, Himmler was right next to me. After the first volley, Himmler directly approached me and looked into the pit. He observed that one was still alive. He told me: "Lieutenant, shoot him!" I received a carbine and gave this man a coup de grâce. Himmler stayed next to me."

(interrogation of Di. of 8 January 1963, BArch B 162/5033, p. 1103 ff.; )

In the post-war narrative of Himmler's adjutant Karl Wolff, "a piece of brain splashed onto [Himmler's] coat", who was "disgusted..threw up" and "seemed to sway a bit" (interrogation of Wolff of 13 February 1962, BArch B 162/5027, p. 14, see also Karl Wolff on Himmler's Visit to Minsk). This incident has been not confirmed by anybody else who had been at the scene. While the Higher SS and Police leader of Russia-Center Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski stated that Himmler was "pale", he also testified that "the reading that Himmler cried or threw up is false" (interrogation of von dem Bach-Zelewski of 19 December 1962, BArch B 162/5033, p. 1079).

In any case, Himmler's physiological reaction could not have been too strong as he was still able to give a speech to the members of Einsatzkommando 8 after the shooting. His impressions and/or the wish of SS leaders made Himmler justify and take responsibility for the mass killing of people, mostly Jews for no legal reason and without any trial. Both von dem Bach-Zelewski and the Einsatzkommando 8 leader Otto Bradfisch claimed they pushed Himmler into this (von dem Bach-Zelewski's account quoted in Aufbau, 23 August 1946, p. 2 and interrogation of Bradfisch of 9 June 1958, BArch B 162/5029, p.11).

The essence of Himmler's speech is summarised in the trial judgement against Karl Wolff based on seven witnesses:

"Himmler declared after the shootings that the hard struggle that the German people had to undertake made harsh measures such as this imperative. The Jews were the bearers of world Bolshevism and they must therefore be destroyed. He and Hitler had assumed responsibility for this before the court of history. The task was difficult, but it had to be carried out."

(Justiz und NS-Verbrechen Band, vol. 20, p. 436, English translation from Richard J. Evans, David Irving, Hitler and Holocaust Denial: Electronic Edition, back-up link)

In their post-war testimonies, Wolff and von dem Bach-Zelewskis explained away the execution that it concerned only convicted partisans and their helpers. In reality, it had been just another mass killing of people picked up as supposed "radical elements", an extremely broad term set by the Nazi ideology. As the police platoon leader in charge of the shooting noticed:

"It is incomprehensible to me how anybody, who has experienced the execution at the time, could get the idea that this was a military execution of criminals."

(interrogation of Di. of 8 January 1963, BArch B 162/5033, p. 1107).

After the show killing, Himmler visited a transit camp for Soviet POWs, took lunch and then a drive through the Jewish ghetto in Minsk. The next station of the trip reads as follows:

"Visiting the asylum"

(Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, p. 195)

This "sightseeing tour of a small insane-asylum, near Minsk" was also mentioned by von dem Bach-Zelewski in 1945/46 way before Himmler's diary was available. He further stated that the visit was followed by a talk between Himmler, Nebe, Wolff and himself, where "Himmler orders Nebe to 'free' the insane from their suffering" and "to make use of a more human method of killing" than the shooting in the morning putting too much strain on the execution squad. Nebe was supposed to try explosives (handwritten manuscript of von dem Bach-Zelewski, NARA Record Group 238, M1270/1/111, p. 41, English translation from p. 36; testimony of von dem Bach-Zelewski, quoted in Aufbau, 23 August 1946, p. 2).

Von dem Bach-Zelewski's testimony is the only direct source on this conversation, and so it should be taken carefully. But the order to liquidate the asylum is plausible given the Euthanasia in the Third Reich and the fact that Nebe's Einsatzgruppe B reported the killing of 632 mentally ill in Minsk about sevens weeks later. The subsequent events, which will be described in the following, support the essence of von dem Bach-Zelewski's account that Himmler ordered to kill mentally ill in the area with supposedly more human methods of killing.

Enhanced Killing Method for the East

The day after the show execution with Himmler, von dem Bach-Zelewski cabled to the Higher SS and Police Leader of the Warthegau Wilhelm Koppe, who had previously carried out the gassing of mentally ill in Soldau, to get a demonstration of the "procedure" applied by the SS-Sonderkommando Lange (Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 1999, p. 648, also Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, p. 195). This procedure concerned the killing of mentally ill people as suggested by Koppe's later request of early October 1941 "to sent Sonderkommando Lange with suitable repair [recte: apparatus] for the clearing of three of their asylums near Novgorod" (Gassing of Mental Patients by Sonderkommando Lange in Novgorod). Whereas in the German Altreich mentally ill people were killed in stationary gas chambers using carbon monoxide gas bottles, the Sonderkommando Lange operating in annexed Polish territory mounted the carbon monoxide bottles on a trailer attached to truck, whose cargo box served as gas chamber (see Beer, Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden, English translation here).

There is no evidence that Sonderkommando Lange actually managed to demonstrate their mobile gas chamber in Minsk. Instead, Nebe went forward to carry out some new killing methods. Nebe was not only in charge of Einsatzgruppe B, but also head of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt (RKPA) in Berlin (RSHA office V), to which also the Criminal Technical Institute (KTI) of the Security Police belonged. The institute had already assisted in implementing the Euthanasia gassings with carbon monoxide bottles.

In September 1941, Nebe called his specialist on explosives and toxicology Albrecht Widmann from the KTI to Minsk and Mogilev for the killing of mentally ill people with explosives and engine exhaust because "he could not demand from his men to shoot incurable mentally ill" (interrogation of Widmann of 11 January 1960, BArch B 162/5066, p. 130). The dating September 1941 follows from the testimony of Widmann (interrogation of 27 January 1960, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ZS3120, p. 11) and his laboratory assistant Hans Sc. (interrogation of 6 April 1960, BArch B 162/4338, p. 215, cf. Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord, p. 369) as well as the strength of the Mogilev asylum of "910 persons" on 3 September 1941 (cited in Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 2012, p. 649) and the Einsatzgruppen report of 9 October 1941 that "in Minsk and Mogilew 632 and 836  mentally ill people were specially treated" (activity report USSR no. 108 of 9 October 1941, Angrick et al, Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion, p. 663).

The KTI staff (Albrecht Widmann  & Hans Sc.) and two RKPA drivers (Alfred Ba. & No.) left Berlin to Belorussia to implement the homicidal gassing of mentally ill with engine exhaust in Mogilev (see German Footage of a Homicidal Gassing with Engine Exhaust. Part 4: Responsibility (II)). The asylum earlier visited by Himmler near Minsk (Novinki) was likewise liquidated in September 1941 using engine exhaust (examination of Akimova of 18 November 1946, quoted in Aly, Aussonderung und Tod, p. 88 f.). Nebe also attributed this killing in Minsk to his group in the above-cited activity report USSR no. 108. It is, however, not known so far who was the "chemist" mentioned by Akimova on the scene, whether Widmann or yet somebody else (Gerlach suggests it may have been the KTI chemist Heinrich Hoffmann, see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, p. 649).

The KTI/RKPA team also carried out Nebe's idea of killing with explosives and blew up a bunker with mentally ill in Minsk. It succeeded only in a second attempt, and the result was a mess to clean up (interrogation of Albert Widmann of 11 January 1960, BArch B 162/5066, p. 130ff.; interrogation of Hans Sc. of 6 April 1960, BArch B 162/4338, p. 215 ff.; interrogation of Alfred Ba. of  17 March 1960, BArch B 162/4338, p. 141 ff.; interrogation of Wilhelm Ja. of 5 April 1960, BArch B 162/4338, p. 209 f.; interrogation of Paul Di. of 8 January 1963, BArch B 162/5033, p. 1108; interrogation of Andreas von Amburger of 27 December 1945, BArch B 162/21555 p. 1327). 

One may wonder why Nebe tried such a rather crude method. He may have genuinely considered it as an option. The explosion brings immediate death if done correctly. Nebe was familiar with explosives: he was an officer of an engineering battalion in World War 1 (see Nebe's curriculum vitae, quoted in Rathert, Verbrechen und Verschwörung, p. 18) and led the investigations into the assassination attempt on Hitler of 8 November 1939 with explosives by Johann Georg Elser. More speculative is whether Nebe actually tried to test an assassination attempt under the disguise of the Euthanasia. Note that in 1943, there had been another killing action with explosives near Minsk. After the removal of mass graves at the extermination site Maly Trostinez, members of the so-called Sonderkommando 1005 blew up their working prisoners, which had been locked up in a bunker (interrogation of Adolf Rübe of 7 September 1959, BArch B 162/1325, p. 55f.).

In any case, the killings in Mogilev and Minsk in September 1941 showed Nebe that the "killing with exhaust gas is to be preferred" (interrogation of Widmann of 11 January 1960, BArch B162/5066, p. 130 ff.). So far, the actions were limited to mentally ill people in asylums, which made up only a small fraction of the victims of Einsatzgruppe B. The bulk of the killing - Jewish families - was still carried out by bullets for some time.

Prototype Gas Van with Engine Exhaust

For the decentralised mass killings, the vast Russian territory, the most suitable killing method to replace shootings was considered the use of mobile gas chambers with engine exhaust. This technique merged the mobility of the gas vans of Sonderkommando Lange using carbon monoxide bottles with the readily available exhaust gas from gasoline engines.

In collaboration with the KTI, the RSHA motor pool department constructed homicidal gas vans operating with engine exhaust. The exhaust of a truck (possibly an Opel Blitz) was to be pumped into the cargo box mounted on its chassis. The vehicle was brought to the KTI, where the carbon monoxide concentration which developed in the cargo box was measured. The first test gassing on human beings was performed on Russian POWs in Sachsenhausen concentration camp (interrogation of Theodor Le. of 6 February 1959, BArch B 162/5066, p. 106 ff., interrogation of Helmut Ho. of 13 October 1958, BArch B 162/5066, p. 88f., interrogation of Hans Schmidt of 11 December 1958 [only on gas analysis], BArch B 162/1602, p. 21, cf.  Beer, Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden).

There is no evidence that the killing in Minsk ordered by Himmler was originally meant as a test run for homicidal gas vans employing engine exhaust. Von dem Bach's activity to get Sonderkommando Lange with its carbon monoxide bottles to Minsk suggests that this was not an issue yet by August 1941. However, it stands to reason that Nebe's killings in the Minsk and Mogilev asylums in September 1941 were also related to the development of the gas vans operating with engine exhaust, because 

a) they employed the same murder technique 

b) both the gassings in Mogilev and Minsk and the development of the homicidal gas vans were carried out by the Criminal Technical Institute of the RSHA 

c) the gas van prototype was likely constructed and tested after the asylum gassings. Ho. and Le. dated tests on the prototype gas van to Winter 1941/1942. Taking a temperature drop close to zero as the beginning of "Winter", the tests had to be taken place in or after late October 1941 (see, e.g. temperatures here).

d) Nebe's staff member Andreas von Amburger testified that "based on these experiments, the so-called gas vans were subsequently produced" (interrogation of 27 December 1945, BArch B162/21555, p. 1329)

First Series of Gas Vans of Einsatzgruppe B

After the tests at the KTI and in Sachsenhausen turned out as successful, further gas vans based on 3 tons Diamond T (possibly also on French/other American) chassis were constructed and distributed among the Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommando Chelmno at the end of 1941, mainly for the extermination of the Jews. The gassing boxes were built and mounted on the chassis by the Gaubschat company in Berlin.

Two Diamond T gas vans were sent to Riga to Einsatzgruppe A in December 1941 and passed on to Minsk in Spring 1942. They were operated by the gas van drivers Karl Gebel and Erich Gnewuch. Another gas van driven by Wilhelm Findeisen was delivered to Einsatzgruppe C in Kiev in November/December 1941. A fourth gas van was supposedly employed by Einsatzgruppe D since December 1941 (according to Justiz und NS-Verbrechen Band XL, Verfahren 816, p. 287, cf. Beer, Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden, p. 413; it is unclear from the judgement on what evidence the dating is based on; however, according to Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord. Einsatzgruppe D, the first gas van was used by Einsatzgruppe D since spring 1942). Two gas vans ended up in Chelmno in December 1941. Mathias Beer has designated these six vehicles as the first series of gas vans. The figure seems to be confirmed by the head of the technical department of the RSHA Walther Rauff ("In so far as I can recall I only supplied 5 or 6", affidavit Rauff of 19 October 1945, 2348-PS; this would have omitted the big Saurer series of gas vans though, see below).

However, such distribution of the first gas vans among the Einsatzgruppen is insofar odd as they would have been only supplied to Einsatzgruppe A, C and D, but not to Einsatzgruppe B. Despite the fact that Nebe was head of Einsatzgruppe B until November 1941 (then replaced by Erich Naumann) and also in charge of the RSHA department contributing to the gas van prototype, none of the first series of gas vans, which were supposed to decrease the strain on the killing squads, was dispatched to his former group if this were true. There are several sources not known to Beer at the time, which raise doubts on this representation.

On 13 December 1941, around the time the first series of gas vans were delivered to the Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommando Chelmno, Nebe cabled to his successor Naumann that "[t]wo of the special vehicles we dealt with in our last discussion will be deployed in course of the following week to the Einsatzgruppe" (document 2 here). Although "special vehicles" could apply to other types of vehicles as well (see Operation and Situation report of Einsatzgruppe B of 14 July 1941, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion II, p. 58 f.; it summarises sanitary vehicles, radio car, mobile workshop as special vehicles), it was also a common term for homicidal gas vans in the correspondence (see letter from Walther Rauff to KTI of 26 March 1942, RHSA office II D 3 a memo of 27 April 1942, telex from Emanuel Schäfer to Friedrich Pradel of 9 June 1942).

Indeed, the existence of two gas vans of the first series is documented in the Einsatzgruppe B motor pool for early 1942. The group's activity and situation report of 1 March 1942 summarises the fleet of vehicles and includes two smaller gas vans operating for Einsatzkommando 8 (Figure 4):

Figure 4.

"Both smaller gas vans will be sent to SK 7a and SK 7b after the completion the operation at EK 8."

(activity and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B of 1 March 1942, cf. Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen II, p. 293)

The gas vans were assigned to the Einsatzgruppe before 16 February 1942, since they are not mentioned among the new additions in the reporting period. It stands to reason that these "two smaller gas vans" are identical to the two "special vehicles" Nebe promised Naumann on 13 December 1941.

This interpretation is somewhat supported by the testimony of the gas van driver Gebel. According to him, he and Gwenuch were not alone with their gas vans on the way to Einsatzgruppe A in Riga, but there had been 3-4 "vehicles of this kind" (interrogation of Gebel of 23 October 1962, BArch B162 / 5068, p. 624). Hence, it's conceivable that a convoy of three to four gas vans was split among Einsatzgruppe A and the neighbouring Einsatzgruppe B. In case there had been only three gas vans, two were first assigned to Einsatzgruppe B (including either Gebel or Gwenuch), while one of those was later forwarded to the BdS Minsk.

In the later judgement against the RSHA motor pool members Pradel and Wentritt of 1966, Gebel is cited as having said the other two gas vans were based on Saurer chassis (which made up the second much bigger series of gas vans), which would contradict that these had been smaller gas vans from the first series. However, Gebel made no mention of this in his above-cited earlier interrogation. In fact, he stated that the other vehicles (including Gwenuch's) were "a bit larger" than his own, whereas both his and Gwenuch's vehicle had to be much smaller than the Saurer. Furthermore, the judgement pretty much screwed other related facts - based on the misleading testimony of Friedrich Pradel, head of the Security Police motor pool department - and claimed, e.g. that already the first gas van prototype with engine exhaust was a Saurer.

According to the Einsatzgruppe B report, the two smaller gas vans ended up in the motor pool of Einsatzkommando 8 and were supposed to be passed on to Sonderkommando 7a & b after finishing their task. This is confirmed by the gas van driver Johann Haßler, who remembered that he had to transfer a small gas van he identified as Diamond T chassis to Sonderkommando 7b sometime after his arrival in Smolensk in February 1942:

"Before I resettled to Briansk, where Einsatzkommando 7b was located at the time, a closed box vehicle was given to me together with a document. I had to transfer this vehicle to Einsatzkommando 7b in Briansk. I cannot remember anymore, if I already knew in Smolensk that it was a gas van or only later in Briansk...It was a Diamond van with a capacity of 25 persons."

(interrogation of Haßler of 12 September 1962, BArch B 162/5068, p. 639f.)

According to Haßler, the gas van was employed in 1942 in Baranovichi and Minsk on Jews deported by train and in Orel on partisans as well as in October 1943 on prisoners carrying out the destruction of mass grave sites ("Enterdungsaktion") in Barysaw. Another driver of Sonderkommando 7b confirmed that Haßler took over and drove a 3-ton gas van for Sonderkommando 7b (interrogation of Heinrich Mü. 27 March 1962, BArch B162/18154, p. 44; he remembered the chassis of the gas van as a "Chevrolette").

Second Series of Gas Vans of Einsatzgruppe B

In 1942, the motor pool department of the Security Police obtained several France made Saurer 4.5 - 5 tons chassis with gasoline engines from a Wehrmacht vehicle park for the second series of gas vans. The Einsatzgruppe B was equipped with two of such bigger gas vans since late February 1942 (in addition to the two "smaller gas vans"), which are also mentioned in the above-cited activity and situation report of the group. The new vehicles obtained in the period 16 to 28 February 1942 are listed with the make, license plate and the unit to which they were assigned. The fleet was extended by ten cars and two Saurer "gas vans":

"The gas vans, which arrived in Smolensk on 23 February 1942, were allocated as follows:

EK 8: Truck Saurer Pol 71462
EK 9: Truck Saurer Pol 71457

Both vehicles arrived damaged in Smolensk and were given to the Einsatzkommandos after fixing of the damage."

(activity and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B of 1 March 1942, Figure 4, cf. Deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der UdSSR 1941-1945. Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen II, p. 293)

The transfer of the two Saurer gas vans from Berlin to Smolensk in February 1942 is corroborated by the testimonies of the gas van drivers Johann Haßler and Josef Wendl (interrogation of Wendl of 12 February 1969 YVA TR.10/1118, vol. 1, p. 40ff.; interrogation of Haßler of 26 September 1966, BArch, B162/18154, p. 56f.). Each vehicle was provided with two drivers. The gas vans assigned to Einsatzkommando 9 and 8 - Saurer Pol 71457 and 71462 according to the Einsatzgruppe B report - were driven by Heinrich Miller(?)/Haßler and Wendl/Richard (2nd name unknown), respectively.

According to Wendl, both gas vans crashed into each other before Warsaw, later the brake of his gas van was frozen and damaged near Brest-Litowsk (interrogation of Wendl of 12 February 1969 YVA TR.10/1118, vol. 1, p. 40ff.). This was a typical defect of the Saurer gas vans as confirmed in the letter from August Becker to Walther Rauff of 16 May 1942 (see also Rebuttal of Alvarez on Gas Vans: The Becker Letter). The damage of the vehicles is consistent to the Einsatzgruppe B report, which noted that both gas vans had to undergo repairs upon their arrival in Smolensk.

Haßler, the co-driver of the Saurer assigned to Einsatzkommando 9 (Saurer Pol 71457), recollected the trip as following:

"It was in January or February 1942 that I received marching orders to Berlin...We were four drivers, who received marching orders to Smolensk. Two closed trucks of the make Saurer were given to us. Each vehicle was provided with a driver and co-driver...We drove with the two trucks from Berlin to Smolensk. As far as I remember, we went via Posen, Warsaw, Minsk, Orscha to Smolensk....At the beginning, I did not know it was a gas van. I only learnt this on the trip from Berlin to Smolensk from the drivers...I know that that one of Saurer vehicles came to EK9 and the other to EK8."

(interrogation of Haßler of 26 September 1966, BArch, B162/18154, p. 56f.; Haßler recognised Heinz Schlechte as the driver of his gas van when photographs were shown to him; this is contradicted by his earlier testimony that the driver's name was Heinrich Miller; the first name Heinrich is also confirmed by Wendl)

The dating of the trip is confirmed by a telegram from the State Police Vienna to the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt of 24 November 1942, which mentions that Wendl was ordered to the "Osteinsatz" (duty in the East) on 31 January 1942 (YVA TR.10/1118, vol. 6, p. 13).

It is noteworthy that the activity and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B of 1 March 1942 confirming the testimonies was not known and available to West-German investigators, who interrogated the drivers of the gas vans. The report is never mentioned or hinted to in the files nor is it included in the collection of activity and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B obtained by the West-German from the Soviets (see BArch B 162/21579). In fact, the report was only supplied to East-German investigators, presumably after March 1969, to assist in their case against the former Einsatzkommando 8 member Georg Frentzel (see also Grundmann, Georg Frentzel, p. 50). The report became available in the West by the opening of Russian and East-German archives after the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

Wendl drove the gas van with the license plate Pol 71462 for Einsatzkommando 8 until September 1943. He was temporarily replaced by Heinz Schlechte during his holidays in Summer 1942. The gas van was employed for the killing of Jews in Baranovice/Minsk and the clearing of the Security Service prison in Mogilev (on the former, interrogation of Wendl of 10 March 1964, YVA TR.10/1118, vol. 1, p. 11f.; on the latter, examination of Walter Fi. of 30 September 1968, YVA TR.10/1118/7b, p. 402 ff; examination of Hans Br. of October 1968, YVA TR.10/1118/7a, p. 87 ff; interrogation of Willy Kr. of 16 August 1962, BArch B 162/3298, p. 290;  interrogation of Otto Bu. of  15 June 1962, BArch B 162/3298, p. 222; interrogation of Karl Kä. of 30 August 1960, BArch B 162/3297, p. 45; examination of Karl Str. of October 1968, YVA TR.10/118/7a, p. 149f.; interrogation of Hans Ha. of 10 January 1963, YVA TR.10/1118/5, p. 271; examination of Adolf Pr. of October 1968, YVA TR.10/1118/7b, p. 249; interrogation of Hermann Bo. of 8 May 1968, BArch B 162/17033, p. 3 ff.; examination of Günther St. of 17 September 1968; YVA TR.10/1118/7b, p. 286).

In September 1944, the gas van was stationed with the so-called Sonderkommando Ruryk from Lithuania in Maczki, about 30 km north of Auschwitz concentration camp, according to Auschwitz resistance reports. It was driven by some Oberwachmeister Arndt and was employed to execute convicts of the Kattowitz drum head court-martial (secret message of September 1944, reproduced in How the convergence of evidence works: the gas van of Auschwitz; secret message of 21 September 1944, Nathan Blumental, Dokumenty i Materialy, vol. 1, p. 121). According to Sergey's most recent finding, the gas van was brought to the so-called Praga-Halle of the Auschwitz motor pool for maintenance (see More evidence converges on the homicidal Auschwitz gas van).

Revisionist Arguments

Carlo Mattogno first commented on the document in his Chelmno book (cited via Christian Gerlach's Failure of Plans for an SS Extermination Camp in Mogilëv, Belorussia)  and elaborated his argument in Schiffbruch (English: Inside the Gas Chambers), which Mattogno cites in Christian Gerlach and the "Extermination Camp" at Mogilev and  The "Extermination Camps" of "Aktion Reinhardt" on this subject.

Inside the Gas Chambers is Mattogno's response to Neue Studien zu nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas (book presentation and review in German), which also featured Sergey's finding that the Saurer gas van of Einsatzkommando 8 operated near Auschwitz in 1944. Notice this pointless and bizarre review of Mattogno's book by some denier Ezra MacVie, who did not even read the study being attacked ("I have not perused the work...that our maestro demolishes in Inside the Gas Chambers"). Let's see how "our maestro" performed here:

"This document proves in no way that the 'Einsatzgruppen' employed 'gas vans' for homicidal purposes. In fact, all Saurer trucks had diesel engines, the exhaust gases of which were totally unsuitable for murder, a fact now even acknowledged by orthodox historians, as we have seen earlier."

(Mattogno, Inside the Gas Chambers, p. 113)

The Saurer = Diesel canard has been exhaustively refuted in Rebuttal of Alvarez on Gas Vans. Part I: Why the Diesel Issue is Still Irrelevant (update). Quite on the contrary, many Saurer trucks were equipped with gasoline engines, which were totally suitable for murder.

"The word 'Gaswagen,' in the sense of 'mobile homicidal gas chamber' was coined only after the Second World War by the victorious powers.

(Mattogno, Inside the Gas Chambers, p. 113)

The assertion is utterly refuted by the evidence. The contemporary use of the term Gaswagen (or its abbreviation G-Wagen) is shown by abundant testimonial evidence. Some are compiled in the following:

Wilhelm Ka., Security Police in Minsk:

"During my stay in Minsk I became aware that Gaswagen - so called G-Wagen - existed and were also used."

(interrogation of 3 February 1970, BArch B162 / 3460, p. 48)

Hermann Sch., BdS Minsk:

"...heard rumors of the operation of so called G-Wagen."

(interrogation of 9 April 1970, BArch B 162/3460, p. 73)

Gustav Laabs, gas van driver of Sonderkommando Chelmno:

"Upon questioning, I explain that about 50 people were gassed in the Gaswagen - this was later the commonly used designation - driven by me."

(interrogation of 29 November 1960, BArch B 162/3246, p. 49)

Josef Ru., BdS Minsk:

"I have to say that until I saw the operation of such van, these soldiers who carried out the extermination of the Jews...had told me that these vehicles, which were called special vehicles or Gasnagen [sic], worked with [?] gas."

(interrogation of 30 April 1945, YVA O.53/1, p. 223 ff.)

Walter Mü., Einsatzgruppe A:

"One of the operation orders, I don't remember its number anymore, but it was issued around the turn of the year 1941/1942, referred to the operation of Desinfektionswagen or Gaswagen. Every Einsatzgruppe was provided with 4 vehicles. The operation [order] on the Gaswagen was given with the reason that the people can mentally no longer stand the executions, they wanted to save them from the heavy work of the executions. Some people became crazy and they could not stand the mental strain and gave themselves away to alcohol...As the alcohol excesses became vaster, the Gaswagen were employed."

(examination of 7 October 1970, YVA TR.10/9, p. 721)

Hans Sohns, Sonderkommando 1005 A:

"I just know that I received the order to convert two Gaswagen into vehicles which can be used for accommodation, equipped with a ventilation so that the men could sleep in them overnight." 

(examination of 20 February 1969, BArch B 162/18092, vol. 63/Gl. p. 11)

Richard Vl., Einsatzgruppe B:

"I believe they carried out trials with a so called Gaswagen."

(interrogation of 19 March 1960, BArch B 162/3339, p. 364)

Rudolf Ot., police battalion Lodz:

"They had to undress and were pushed into so called Gaswagen, in which they were killed with  engine exhaust of the engine."

(interrogation of 7 July 1960, BArch, B 162/3245, p. 88)

Johann Haßler, Sonderkommando 7b:

"Ott explained to me that this vehicle was a Gaswagen for gassing partisans."

"On my perpetual asking, the driver told me that it was a secret Gaswagen....When I learnt that this vehicle was a G-Wagen, I told Ott, whom I still trusted at the time, that I want to be relieved as driver of this vehicle."

(interrogation of 25 May 1962, B 162/2265, p. 121 & interrogation of Haßler of 2 September 1966, BArch, B 162/18154, p. 57)

Karl He., Police Battalion in Cholm:

"I remember that I have seen so called Gaswagen from time to time, which drove into the prohibited zone. I could see from about 100 m distance that fresh corpses were unloaded."

(interrogation of  19 November 1959, BArch, B 162/5066, p. 218)

Karl Bo., Sonderkommando 7b:

"These people were later gassed. I only know this from hearsay. However, this information was confirmed for me one day after I saw a so called Gaswagen at the commando."

(interrogation of 13 December 1961, BArch B 162/2264, p. 341)

Otto Kl., Pol. Btl. Res. 3, Einsatzgruppe C:

"There was a grey or black vehicle in the yard. I've seen children, women and men, old and young entering the vehicle. The people were already in the yard. I still remember a woman with a white fur coat. The people were pushed into the vehicle. The doors were closed and the vehicle drove away...It was said that this is a Gaswagen. Under [the term] Gaswagen, I have understood that the exhaust gases are directed to the inside of the vehicle to gas people."

(examination of 4 March 1969, BArch B 162/17921, p. 562)

Max Lu., Wehrmacht in Minsk:

"There were three mass graves each 60 wide and 20 m long dug in the ghetto cemetery. Big vehicles which looked like moving vans were steadily coming from the ghetto. These vehicles were known as so called Gaswagen." 

(examination of 13 December 1949, BArch, B 162/373, p. 294)

August Meyszner, Higher SS and Police Leader in Serbia:

"It is known to me that Schefer (sic!) reported to me, I think in 1942, that a commando with a Gaskraftwagen has arrived in Sajmiste from Berlin and that it had the task to gas Jews only."

(interrogation of Meyszner of 4 September 1946, Eichman trial exhibit T896)

Franz Ei., Einsatzkommando 6:

"In Spring 1942, I was ordered to transfer a Gaswagen to Russia. When I saw the vehicle, I thought it was a moving van. In Cracow, they said "there is another Gaswagen". Because of this remark I looked closer at the vehicle and then knew what it was about. "

(interrogation of 25 October 1965, BArch B 162/1580, p. 14)

Ernst Biberstein, Einsatzkommando 6:

"There was a so called Gaswagen."

(interrogation of Biberstein of 29 June 1947, BArch B 162/1574, p. 159, citing NO-4997)

Robert Mohr, Einsatzkommando 6:

"I've only seen the so called Gaswagen in Stalino"

(interrogation of Mohr of 22 March 1960, BArch B 162/1570, p. 59)

Johannes Ma., Sonderkommando 4a:

"I once saw a big truck fully closed truck in our yard. Somebody said, it is a Gaswagen....I know from hearsay that the driver belonged to our commando and that people died in this vehicle."

(examination of 11 February 1969, BArch, B 162/17920, p. 459)

Franz Pe., Ordinary Police in Chernihiv:

"Two times, I've seen a big closed box vehicle in Chernihiv. Dr. Trettler had told me this is a Gaswagen. I talked with Dr. Trettler about the Gaswagen. He explained that the exhaust are not directed to the outside but to the inside and that the people inside are coming to death."

(examination of 14 January 1968, BArch B 162/17919, p. 184)

Alfred Fr., Pol. Batl. Res. 3, Einsatzgruppe C:

"When I arrived in Kiev, the comrades said that there is a Gaswagen in the yard."

(examination of 4 March 1969, BArch B 162/17921, p. 567)

Heinrich Mü., Sonderkommando 7b:

"Apart from the mentioned vehicles, the staff of Sonderkommado 7b also had a special vehicle, the Gaswagen. The chassis was from a series truck, according to my memory of the type Chevrolette, size about 3 tons."

(interrogation of 27 March 1962, BArch B 162/18154, p. 44)

Emil Gr., Einsatzkommando 11b:

"One day, possibly in April 1942, I saw a vehicle on the yard of our accommodation, which was designated as Gaswagen by the comrades....The comrades explained to me how the vehicle works and then I also saw how from the side of our building about 30-50 people, men, women and children were loaded onto this Gaswagen."

(interrogation of 17 May 1962, BArch B 162/5068, p. 636)

Kurt Fi., Einsatzkommando 12:

"It was told that this was the Gaswagen."

(interrogation of 16 October 1962, BArch, B 162/1151, p. 1387)

Mattogno's predictable response to such damning evidence will be as usual that "a simple testimony...has no value at all" (e.g. as in The "Extermination Camps" of "Aktion Reinhardt", p. 263). His straight rejection of any testimonial evidence is defying any historiographical practice and common sense. It's a simple treatment like that of Mattogno categorically rejecting a whole class of evidence without any comprehensible and founded justification whatsoever, which has no value at all.

Mattogno is also wrong that the term homicidal Gaswagen "does not appear in any other wartime document and which began to circulate as a designation for homicidal vehicles using exhaust gases only after the war" (Chelmno, p. 16).

Figure 5.

In February 1944, a member of the German Security Service wrote a report for the Swiss intelligence, which includes a section on the Einsatzgruppen killings in the East and a description of the homicidal gas vans (Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, E27#1000/721#9928-6*, p. 60, Figure 5, cf. Haas, Wenn man gewusst hätte, was sich drüben im Reich abspielt, p. 164; Gerlach, The Extermination of the European Jews, p. 83; Huonker, Roma Sinti Jenische, p. 136, who assigns the report to Paul Dickopf).

The (hearsay) description captured the layout and operation of the gas vans well, except for its mention of a "tipping device" (although such was indeed considered and requested - see memo of 27 April 1942 on a "fast unloading device for the special vehicles", which explains why it was referred to here; the report has also exaggerated the gas van capacities by at least a factor of two). The insider of the German of the Security Service termed the gas vans as "Nebe'sche Gaswagen". Nebe played indeed a significant role in the development of the gas vans via his gassing experiment in Mogilev and Minsk and the involvement of the Criminal Technical Institute (see previous part).

In short, the term Gaswagen was clearly used by the Germans during the war to describe their mobile gas chambers. Mattogno's assertion that the term was coined after the war by the Allies is merely derived from his faith that there had been no Germans homicidal gas vans so that the word Gaswagen in a homicidal sense had to be necessarily coined by "victorious powers". Of course, since both Mattogno and his Holocaust denier buddy Alvarez have utterly failed to explain and rebut the overwhelming evidence on German homicidal gas vans, including contemporary German documents, the claim is historically unfounded.

"Earlier, a 'Gaswagen' had simply been an abbreviation for 'Holzgaswagen' (a vehicle using gas from the gasification of wood)"

 (Mattogno, Inside the Gas Chambers, p. 113).

Actually, the term Gaswagen used to have several meanings:

• abbreviation for Holzgaswagen (producer gas vehicle); note that Mattogno did not do his homework to provide even a single example for such, so let's do the job for him:
  

  "Wenn der Gaswagen mit dem Dieselwagen konkurrieren will, darf der Holzpreis nicht über 2,5 Pf. je 1 kg liegen."

  (Brennstoff-Chemie: Zeitschrift für Chemie und chemische Technologie der Brenstoffe und ihrer Veredlungsprodukte, Band 14, 1933, p. 315)


• abbreviation for Gastransportwagen (vehicle for transporting gas), e.g.
  

  "Um die Kosten für die Rohrleitungen zu sparen, wurde den Abnehmern Flaschengas geliefert ('Portativ-Gas'); Frankfurter Gaswagen fuhren bis nach Wiesbaden."

  Technikgeschichte: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Technik und Industrie, Band 25, 1936, p. 152


• homicidal gas van, see above.


• antiquated: any vehicle with an internal combustion engine (Küster, Personen- und Lasten-Dampfwagen, 1908, p. 36)
  

The interpretation of the Gaswagen in the Einsatzgruppe B report as producer gas vehicle can be ruled out on several grounds.

First of all, there is no evidence that Einsatzgruppe B used any producer gas vehicles in 1942. There is no Holzgaswagen reference among the contemporary German documents as well numerous testimonies of group members and related witnesses in the files (BArch B162/4338 - 4340, 2265, 3339, 3608-3610, 30896, 3275, 3297, 26742, 2264, 3314, 3315, 3298, 1817), including that highly relevant ones of the motor pool heads Johannes Mö. (Einsatzgruppe B staff), Heinrich Mü. (Sonderkommando 7b), Hermann Bo. (Einsatzkommano 8) and  Ernst El. (police battalion attached to Einsatzkommando 8).

Secondly, there is no reason why the Einsatzgruppen should have employed inferior performing producer gas vehicles in 1942 at all. According to Eckermann, Fahren mit Holz, p. 126, the conversion to producer gas meant "reduced performance, poorer efficiency, cumbersome handling, higher maintenance and new supply provisions". The decree of Reich Minister for Weapons, Munitions, and Armaments Albert Speer on the conversion of trucks on non-liquid fuels of 24 September 1942 excluded the firefighters and authorities receiving special contingents of fuel, and so were therefore also indeed the police forces (Kroll, Der Gasgenerator, 1943, p. 131).

The Einsatzgruppe B received their gasoline mainly from the army and even had their own tank trucks to supply its commandos. In January 1943, the group complained they received "only amounts of 200-400 Liters" of gasoline since several tank wagons failed to appear (operation and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B on the period 16 to 31 January 1943, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion II, p. 508). The report did not mention any producer gas vehicles to be used instead but remarked that "the use of vehicles is only possible in the most urgent cases". In the report for March 1943, the group discussed the supply and reserve of gasoline/Diesel, but did not mention any producer gas vehicles or its fuel supply either (operation and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B on the period 1 to 31 March 1943, Angrick et al., Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion II, p. 553). This also supports that there had been no producer gas vehicles in the group.

Thirdly, the Einsatzgruppen report does not break down the vehicles into their type of fuel used but into the kind of vehicles. Any supposed producer gas trucks were likely to be listed in the category LKWs (trucks) instead of making up a new category, see the breakdown for Einsatzkommando 8:

"35 cars, 3 trucks, 1 ambulance, 1 gas van"

(activity and situation report of Einsatzgruppe B of 1 March 1942, Deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der UdSSR 1941-1945. Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen II, p. 294)

This was also realized by Alvarez, who refuted his denier colleague on this point:

"It is possible that these trucks were equipped with wood gas generators. However, in this case the term “gas van” is unlikely to refer to them potentially having such a gas generator, as the report appears to list the vehicles not by fuel source but rather by general vehicle type."

(Alvarez, The Gas Vans, p. 93)

Mattogno entirely ignored this critique despite that Alvarez' book is cited on the very same page in Inside the Gas Chambers and in the same paragraph in his Inconvenient History article!

Fourthly, the gas vans were obviously performing some special task. The report mentions that the smaller gas vans were carrying out an "operation at EK 8" and were then supposed to be equally distributed among the commandos (in contrast to this, it would have made more sense to cluster producer gas vehicles within one motor pool to concentrate maintenance and fuel supply).

Since the term Gaswagen was a functional description of their purpose, these vehicles were meant to apply or transport some sort of gas. Since the main task of the Einsatzgruppen was to liquidate people as shown out in the first part of this post, it is most reasonable to conclude that these vehicles were used to kill people with poison gas, as is also corroborated by numerous testimonial evidence.

Another piece of evidence supporting the homicidal nature of the Saurer Gaswagen can be found in the set of telexes in Nuremberg evidence PS-501 (see Rebuttal of Alvarez on Gas Vans: The Schäfer, Trühe & Rauff Telexes). According to the documents, a "special vehicle Saurer" with the license plate Pol 71463 was supposed to be sent to Minsk with "exhaust hoses" to carry out the "special treatment" of Jews. The license plate was registered right after the "Gaswagen...Saurer Pol 71462" of Einsatzkommando 8 and close to the "Gaswagen...Saurer Pol 71457" of Einsatzkommando 9 suggesting that there had been a batch registration of Saurer gas vans. Indeed, there was a whole series of Saurer gas vans as also confirmed by other RSHA correspondence according to which 20 "special vehicle bodies" for Saurer chassis had been constructed. The "special vehicles", whose "empty space also needs to be filled with CO" and which were to be equipped with a "fast unloading device", could be replaced by the use of "steel bottles with carbon monoxide or respectively other remedies" (memo of 23 June 1942; memo from Just of 5 June 1942; letter from Rauff to the Gaubschat company of 30 April 1942; letter from Rauff to the Criminal Technical Institute of 26 March 1942). The contemporary German documents mutually corroborate that they are talking about homicidal gas vans.

Mattogno also asserts that "in all likelihood" the Gaswagen POL 71462, which turned up near Auschwitz in 1944, is actually identical to a producer gas vehicle used by the central construction office Auschwitz at least since September 1942 (Mattogno, Inside the Gas Chambers, p. 113f.). Only Mattogno knows where this "likelihood" comes from; certainly not from the facts. Quite the opposite, it is implausible that a vehicle just assigned to Einsatzkommando 8 in Mogilev on 23 February 1942 would pop up four months later 1000 km westwards at some entirely different authority not even part of the RHSA, the central construction office Auschwitz motor pool. There is no evidence connecting the producer gas vehicle by the central construction office Auschwitz in 1942 to Einsatzgruppe B's previous gas van, which was only spotted in Auschwitz in 1944 anyway. In fact, according to the driver Josef Wendl and his motor pool head Hermann Bo., the vehicle stayed in Mogilev until mid-1943.

This blunder gets right away accompanied by an internal contradiction in the same book, even on the very same page. Mattogno cites an Auschwitz document of 6 September 1944, according to which a producer gas truck was supplied to the central construction office, and claims that this was the Saurer Gaswagen from Einsatzkommando 8. In The "Extermination Camps" of "Aktion Reinhardt", p. 263, he explains that this is to be understood as that "the Saurer truck with the number plate POL 71462...was later sent to Auschwitz at the beginning of September 1944". So which one is it? Either the Gaswagen operated in Auschwitz in September 1942 or was it sent to Auschwitz "at the beginning of September 1944". Mattogno does not seem to mind throwing around two contradictory theories, both not backed up by any evidence. As said, there is absolutely nothing that links the Saurer Gaswagen Pol 71462 to the producer gas vehicle in the motor pool of the central construction office Auschwitz.

The gas van was assigned to the so-called Sonderkommando/Einsatzkommando Ruryk in Lithuania, which was stationed  "on the sandy soil near Maczki" after its retreat from the East (resistance report of 21 September 1944, from Nathan Blumental, Dokumenty i Materialy 1, 1946, p. 121, cf. Filip Friedman, To jest Oswieciem!, 1945, p. 70 f.). The vehicle was used "to execute civilians convicted by the so-called Polizei-Sondergericht", the drumhead court-martial of the Gestapo Kattowitz (How the convergence of evidence works: the gas van of Auschwitz). Mattogno thinks "it would have spoken volumes about the local SS men’s intelligence, had they added such a vehicle to the many killing methods allegedly already practised in that 'extermination camp'" (Inside the Gas Chambers, p. 115). However, already in 1945 Filip Friedman (cited above) provided a plausible explanation for the use of the gas van, which was available anyway: the Germans considered it more suitable for killing small groups of a dozen to 30 people without attracting anyone's attention. It says volumes about Mattogno's intelligence that he could not figure this out for himself.

Figure 6.

The nature of the Gaswagen as producer gas vehicle can also be ruled out on another ground. As Mattogno himself points out, "the structure of a generator vehicle differed greatly from an ordinary truck" (see also Figure 6, from Eckermann, Fahren mit Holz, p. 182). Yet, precisely the highly visible producer gas generator mounted behind the driver's cabin on such vehicles is entirely absent from the resistance reports and witness accounts (1 2). Already, for this reason, the Gaswagen Pol 71462 was clearly not a producer gas truck.

 Conclusion

The Einsatzgruppen were mobile killing units mostly engaged in decimating and eliminating the Jewish population in 1941/1942. According to a contemporary German document, Einsatzgruppe B operated four "Gaswagen" (gas vans) since March 1942 to perform their tasks. The license plates and make of the two larger "Saurer Gaswagen" fit to that of another "Saurer special vehicle", which had carried out the "special treatment" of people using "exhaust hoses" in Serbia according to another, independent set of documents. The dispatch and operation of homicidal gas vans among Einsatzgruppe B are independently corroborated by numerous testimonial evidence. Furthermore, one of the Saurer gas vans was separately identified as gas van in September 1944 near Auschwitz.

Mattogno's arguments that the Gaswagen could not have been homicidal gas vans because Saurer - making up two of the four vehicles - were always Diesel and because the term Gaswagen as homicidal gas van was coined only after the war is both demonstrably false. His own explanation that the Gaswagen were producer gas trucks is implausible and not supported by any evidence.

______________________
changelog:
15 January 2017: corrected citation from NARA Record Group 238, added link to Aufbau reproduction
23 December 2018: linguistic correction